coreboot-kgpe-d16/src/security/Kconfig

# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only

# These features are implemented in src/lib/cbfs.c, but they are security
# features so sort them in here for menuconfig.
source "src/lib/Kconfig.cbfs_verification"

source "src/security/vboot/Kconfig"
source "src/security/tpm/Kconfig"
source "src/security/memory/Kconfig"
source "src/security/intel/Kconfig"
source "src/security/lockdown/Kconfig"
{security,soc}/*/Kconfig: Replace GPLv2 long form headers with SPDX header Change-Id: Ie3721f6a93dacb8014f93aa86780d51a659a68df Signed-off-by: Elyes HAOUAS <ehaouas@noos.fr> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/41145 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> 2020-05-07 12:38:15 +02:00			`# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only`
security/vboot: Move vboot2 to security kconfig section This commit just moves the vboot sources into the security directory and fixes kconfig/makefile paths. Fix vboot2 headers Change-Id: Icd87f95640186f7a625242a3937e1dd13347eb60 Signed-off-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin@das-labor.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/22074 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@google.com> 2017-10-17 17:02:29 +02:00
cbfs: Add verification for RO CBFS metadata hash This patch adds the first stage of the new CONFIG_CBFS_VERIFICATION feature. It's not useful to end-users in this stage so it cannot be selected in menuconfig (and should not be used other than for development) yet. With this patch coreboot can verify the metadata hash of the RO CBFS when it starts booting, but it does not verify individual files yet. Likewise, verifying RW CBFSes with vboot is not yet supported. Verification is bootstrapped from a "metadata hash anchor" structure that is embedded in the bootblock code and marked by a unique magic number. This anchor contains both the CBFS metadata hash and a separate hash for the FMAP which is required to find the primary CBFS. Both are verified on first use in the bootblock (and halt the system on failure). The CONFIG_TOCTOU_SAFETY option is also added for illustrative purposes to show some paths that need to be different when full protection against TOCTOU (time-of-check vs. time-of-use) attacks is desired. For normal verification it is sufficient to check the FMAP and the CBFS metadata hash only once in the bootblock -- for TOCTOU verification we do the same, but we need to be extra careful that we do not re-read the FMAP or any CBFS metadata in later stages. This is mostly achieved by depending on the CBFS metadata cache and FMAP cache features, but we allow for one edge case in case the RW CBFS metadata cache overflows (which may happen during an RW update and could otherwise no longer be fixed because mcache size is defined by RO code). This code is added to demonstrate design intent but won't really matter until RW CBFS verification can be supported. Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Change-Id: I8930434de55eb938b042fdada9aa90218c0b5a34 Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/41120 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Patrick Georgi <pgeorgi@google.com> 2020-05-07 02:06:35 +02:00			`# These features are implemented in src/lib/cbfs.c, but they are security`
			`# features so sort them in here for menuconfig.`
			`source "src/lib/Kconfig.cbfs_verification"`

security/vboot: Move vboot2 to security kconfig section This commit just moves the vboot sources into the security directory and fixes kconfig/makefile paths. Fix vboot2 headers Change-Id: Icd87f95640186f7a625242a3937e1dd13347eb60 Signed-off-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin@das-labor.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/22074 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@google.com> 2017-10-17 17:02:29 +02:00			`source "src/security/vboot/Kconfig"`
security/tpm: Move tpm TSS and TSPI layer to security section * Move code from src/lib and src/include into src/security/tpm * Split TPM TSS 1.2 and 2.0 * Fix header includes * Add a new directory structure with kconfig and makefile includes Change-Id: Id15a9aa6bd367560318dfcfd450bf5626ea0ec2b Signed-off-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin@das-labor.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/22103 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Reinauer <stefan.reinauer@coreboot.org> 2017-10-18 17:13:07 +02:00			`source "src/security/tpm/Kconfig"`
security: Add memory subfolder Add files to introduce a memory clearing framework. Introduce Kconfig PLATFORM_HAS_DRAM_CLEAR that is to be selected by platforms, that are able to clear all DRAM. Introduce Kconfig SECURITY_CLEAR_DRAM_ON_REGULAR_BOOT that is user selectable to always clear DRAM on non S3 boot. The function security_clear_dram_request tells the calling platform when to wipe all DRAM. Will be extended by TEE frameworks. Add Documentation for the new security API. Change-Id: Ifba25bfdd1057049f5cbae8968501bd9be487110 Signed-off-by: Patrick Rudolph <patrick.rudolph@9elements.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/31548 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Walter <christian.walter@9elements.com> 2019-02-21 12:04:21 +01:00			`source "src/security/memory/Kconfig"`
security/intel: Add TXT infrastructure * Add Kconfig to enable TXT * Add possibility to add BIOS and SINIT ACMs * Set default BIOS ACM alignment * Increase FIT space if TXT is enabled The following commits depend on the basic Kconfig infrastructure. Intel TXT isn't supported until all following commits are merged. Change-Id: I5f0f956d2b7ba43d4e7e0062803c6d8ba569a052 Signed-off-by: Patrick Rudolph <patrick.rudolph@9elements.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/34585 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: David Hendricks <david.hendricks@gmail.com> 2019-07-25 11:55:30 +02:00			`source "src/security/intel/Kconfig"`
security: Add common boot media write protection Introduce boot media protection settings and use the existing boot_device_wp_region() function to apply settings on all platforms that supports it yet. Also remove the Intel southbridge code, which is now obsolete. Every platform locks the SPIBAR in a different stage. For align up with the common mrc cache driver and lock after it has been written to. Tested on Supermicro X11SSH-TF. The whole address space is write-protected. Change-Id: Iceb3ecf0bde5cec562bc62d1d5c79da35305d183 Signed-off-by: Patrick Rudolph <patrick.rudolph@9elements.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/32704 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> 2019-12-03 19:43:06 +01:00			`source "src/security/lockdown/Kconfig"`