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coreboot-kgpe-d16/src/lib/tpm2_tlcl.c

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tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
/*
* Copyright 2016 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
* Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
* found in the LICENSE file.
*/
lib/tpm2: do not create all NVRAM spaces with the same set of attributes The TPM spaces created by the RO need to have different attributes depending on the space's use. The firmware rollback counter and MRC hash spaces are created by the RO code and need to be protected at the highest level: it should be impossible to delete or modify the space once the RO exits, and it is how it is done before this patch. The rest of the spaces should be possible to modify or recreate even after the RO exits. Let's use different set of NVRAM space attributes to achieve that, and set the 'pcr0 unchanged' policy only for the firmware counter and MRC cache spaces. The definitions of the attributes can be found in "Trusted Platform Module Library Part 2: Structures", Revision 01.16, section "13.2 TPMA_NV (NV Index Attributes)." CQ-DEPEND=CL:410127 BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:59651 TEST=verified that the reef system boots fine in both normal and recovery modes; using tpmc confirmed that firmware, kernel and MRC cache NVRAM spaces are readable in both and writeable only in recovery mode. Change-Id: I1a1d2459f56ec929c9a92b39175888b8d1bcda55 Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/17388 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <paulepanter@users.sourceforge.net> Reviewed-by: Andrey Pronin <apronin@chromium.org>
2016-11-11 18:36:50 +01:00
#include <antirollback.h>
Provide CAR decoration for tpm2 statics Decorated tpm2 statics with CAR_GLOBAL BUG=chrome-os-partner:55083 BRANCH=none TEST=none Change-Id: I85620d5c6ffddab5514c01c2c652670bf33b4e7e Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: ae43d3bb7fed5b891ed38cd268bfe4e1416b77e2 Original-Change-Id: I871442ec096836a86870f8d53a3058c9c040cff8 Original-Signed-off-by: Victor Prupis <vprupis@google.com> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/373243 Original-Commit-Ready: Stefan Reinauer <reinauer@google.com> Original-Tested-by: Stefan Reinauer <reinauer@google.com> Original-Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/16366 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
2016-08-19 19:45:04 +02:00
#include <arch/early_variables.h>
tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
#include <console/console.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <lib/tpm2_tlcl_structures.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <tpm.h>
#include <vb2_api.h>
#include "tpm2_marshaling.h"
/*
* This file provides interface between firmware and TPM2 device. The TPM1.2
* API was copied as is and relevant functions modified to comply with the
* TPM2 specification.
*/
static void *tpm_process_command(TPM_CC command, void *command_body)
{
drivers/i2c/tpm: use iobuf library for marshaling commands Use the iobuf API instead of relying on own buffer management. It also provides consistency between marshaling and unmarshaling code paths for propagating return values instead of overloading the values of existing variables. BUG=b:36598499 Change-Id: Iec0bbff1312e8e6ec616d1528db8667f32e682c9 Signed-off-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/19063 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com>
2017-03-25 06:38:45 +01:00
struct obuf ob;
struct ibuf ib;
size_t out_size;
tpm2_tlcl: Use signed integer for tpm2_marshal_command return value The tpm2_marshal_command() function returns a negative value on error, so we must use a signed type for the return value. This was found by the coverity scan: https://scan.coverity.com/projects/coreboot?tab=overview CID:1357675 CID:1357676 Change-Id: I56d2ce7d52b9b70e43378c13c66b55ac2948f218 Signed-off-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@google.com> Found-by: Coverity Scan Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15717 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <paulepanter@users.sourceforge.net> Reviewed-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org>
2016-07-15 13:51:45 +02:00
size_t in_size;
drivers/i2c/tpm: use iobuf library for marshaling commands Use the iobuf API instead of relying on own buffer management. It also provides consistency between marshaling and unmarshaling code paths for propagating return values instead of overloading the values of existing variables. BUG=b:36598499 Change-Id: Iec0bbff1312e8e6ec616d1528db8667f32e682c9 Signed-off-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/19063 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com>
2017-03-25 06:38:45 +01:00
const uint8_t *sendb;
tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
/* Command/response buffer. */
Provide CAR decoration for tpm2 statics Decorated tpm2 statics with CAR_GLOBAL BUG=chrome-os-partner:55083 BRANCH=none TEST=none Change-Id: I85620d5c6ffddab5514c01c2c652670bf33b4e7e Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: ae43d3bb7fed5b891ed38cd268bfe4e1416b77e2 Original-Change-Id: I871442ec096836a86870f8d53a3058c9c040cff8 Original-Signed-off-by: Victor Prupis <vprupis@google.com> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/373243 Original-Commit-Ready: Stefan Reinauer <reinauer@google.com> Original-Tested-by: Stefan Reinauer <reinauer@google.com> Original-Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/16366 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
2016-08-19 19:45:04 +02:00
static uint8_t cr_buffer[TPM_BUFFER_SIZE] CAR_GLOBAL;
uint8_t *cr_buffer_ptr = car_get_var_ptr(cr_buffer);
tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
drivers/i2c/tpm: use iobuf library for marshaling commands Use the iobuf API instead of relying on own buffer management. It also provides consistency between marshaling and unmarshaling code paths for propagating return values instead of overloading the values of existing variables. BUG=b:36598499 Change-Id: Iec0bbff1312e8e6ec616d1528db8667f32e682c9 Signed-off-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/19063 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com>
2017-03-25 06:38:45 +01:00
obuf_init(&ob, cr_buffer_ptr, sizeof(cr_buffer));
if (tpm_marshal_command(command, command_body, &ob) < 0) {
printk(BIOS_ERR, "command %#x\n", command);
tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
return NULL;
}
drivers/i2c/tpm: use iobuf library for marshaling commands Use the iobuf API instead of relying on own buffer management. It also provides consistency between marshaling and unmarshaling code paths for propagating return values instead of overloading the values of existing variables. BUG=b:36598499 Change-Id: Iec0bbff1312e8e6ec616d1528db8667f32e682c9 Signed-off-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/19063 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com>
2017-03-25 06:38:45 +01:00
sendb = obuf_contents(&ob, &out_size);
tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
in_size = sizeof(cr_buffer);
drivers/i2c/tpm: use iobuf library for marshaling commands Use the iobuf API instead of relying on own buffer management. It also provides consistency between marshaling and unmarshaling code paths for propagating return values instead of overloading the values of existing variables. BUG=b:36598499 Change-Id: Iec0bbff1312e8e6ec616d1528db8667f32e682c9 Signed-off-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/19063 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com>
2017-03-25 06:38:45 +01:00
if (tis_sendrecv(sendb, out_size, cr_buffer_ptr, &in_size)) {
tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
printk(BIOS_ERR, "tpm transaction failed\n");
return NULL;
}
drivers/i2c/tpm: use iobuf library for marshaling commands Use the iobuf API instead of relying on own buffer management. It also provides consistency between marshaling and unmarshaling code paths for propagating return values instead of overloading the values of existing variables. BUG=b:36598499 Change-Id: Iec0bbff1312e8e6ec616d1528db8667f32e682c9 Signed-off-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/19063 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com>
2017-03-25 06:38:45 +01:00
ibuf_init(&ib, cr_buffer_ptr, in_size);
return tpm_unmarshal_response(command, &ib);
tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
}
uint32_t tlcl_get_permanent_flags(TPM_PERMANENT_FLAGS *pflags)
{
printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s:%s:%d\n", __FILE__, __func__, __LINE__);
return TPM_SUCCESS;
}
TPM2: Fill in empty tlcl_resume function in TPM2 tlcl On resume, TPM2_Starup(STATE) command needs to be sent to the TPM. This ensures that TPM restores the state saved at last Shutdown(STATE). Since tlcl_resume and tlcl_startup both use the same sequence for sending startup command with different arguments, add a common function that can be used by both. BUG=chrome-os-partner:58043 BRANCH=None TEST=Verified that on resume coreboot no longer complains about index read for 0x1007. Return value is 0 as expected. Change-Id: Ib8640acc9cc9cdb3ba5d40e0ccee5ca7d67fa645 Signed-off-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/16832 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org>
2016-09-30 21:53:19 +02:00
static uint32_t tlcl_send_startup(TPM_SU type)
tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
{
TPM2: Fill in empty tlcl_resume function in TPM2 tlcl On resume, TPM2_Starup(STATE) command needs to be sent to the TPM. This ensures that TPM restores the state saved at last Shutdown(STATE). Since tlcl_resume and tlcl_startup both use the same sequence for sending startup command with different arguments, add a common function that can be used by both. BUG=chrome-os-partner:58043 BRANCH=None TEST=Verified that on resume coreboot no longer complains about index read for 0x1007. Return value is 0 as expected. Change-Id: Ib8640acc9cc9cdb3ba5d40e0ccee5ca7d67fa645 Signed-off-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/16832 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org>
2016-09-30 21:53:19 +02:00
struct tpm2_startup startup;
struct tpm2_response *response;
startup.startup_type = type;
response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_Startup, &startup);
if (response && response->hdr.tpm_code &&
(response->hdr.tpm_code != TPM_RC_INITIALIZE)) {
printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s: Startup return code is %x\n",
__func__, response->hdr.tpm_code);
return TPM_E_IOERROR;
}
tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
return TPM_SUCCESS;
TPM2: Fill in empty tlcl_resume function in TPM2 tlcl On resume, TPM2_Starup(STATE) command needs to be sent to the TPM. This ensures that TPM restores the state saved at last Shutdown(STATE). Since tlcl_resume and tlcl_startup both use the same sequence for sending startup command with different arguments, add a common function that can be used by both. BUG=chrome-os-partner:58043 BRANCH=None TEST=Verified that on resume coreboot no longer complains about index read for 0x1007. Return value is 0 as expected. Change-Id: Ib8640acc9cc9cdb3ba5d40e0ccee5ca7d67fa645 Signed-off-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/16832 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org>
2016-09-30 21:53:19 +02:00
}
uint32_t tlcl_resume(void)
{
return tlcl_send_startup(TPM_SU_STATE);
tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
}
uint32_t tlcl_assert_physical_presence(void)
{
/*
* Nothing to do on TPM2 for this, use platform hierarchy availability
* instead.
*/
return TPM_SUCCESS;
}
tpm2: implement and use pcr_extend command TPM PCRs are used in Chrome OS for two purposes: to communicate crucial information from RO firmware and to protect FW and kernel rollback counters from being deleted. As implemented in a TPM1 compatible way, the PCR extension command requires a prebuilt digest to calculate a new PCR value. TPM2 specification introduces a PCR_Event command, where the TPM itself calculates the digest of an arbitrary length string, and then uses the calculated digest for PCR extension. PCR_Event could be a better option for Chrome OS, this needs to be investigated separately. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=verified that the two PCRs are successfully extended before the RW firmware is called. Change-Id: I38fc88172de8ec8bef56fec026f83058480c8010 Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: 73388139db3ffaf61a3d9027522c5ebecb3ad051 Original-Change-Id: I1a9bab7396fdb652e2e3bc8529b828ea3423d851 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/358098 Original-Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Darren Krahn <dkrahn@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15639 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-07-04 07:20:17 +02:00
/*
* The caller will provide the digest in a 32 byte buffer, let's consider it a
* sha256 digest.
*/
tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
uint32_t tlcl_extend(int pcr_num, const uint8_t *in_digest,
uint8_t *out_digest)
{
tpm2: implement and use pcr_extend command TPM PCRs are used in Chrome OS for two purposes: to communicate crucial information from RO firmware and to protect FW and kernel rollback counters from being deleted. As implemented in a TPM1 compatible way, the PCR extension command requires a prebuilt digest to calculate a new PCR value. TPM2 specification introduces a PCR_Event command, where the TPM itself calculates the digest of an arbitrary length string, and then uses the calculated digest for PCR extension. PCR_Event could be a better option for Chrome OS, this needs to be investigated separately. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=verified that the two PCRs are successfully extended before the RW firmware is called. Change-Id: I38fc88172de8ec8bef56fec026f83058480c8010 Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: 73388139db3ffaf61a3d9027522c5ebecb3ad051 Original-Change-Id: I1a9bab7396fdb652e2e3bc8529b828ea3423d851 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/358098 Original-Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Darren Krahn <dkrahn@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15639 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-07-04 07:20:17 +02:00
struct tpm2_pcr_extend_cmd pcr_ext_cmd;
struct tpm2_response *response;
pcr_ext_cmd.pcrHandle = HR_PCR + pcr_num;
pcr_ext_cmd.digests.count = 1;
pcr_ext_cmd.digests.digests[0].hashAlg = TPM_ALG_SHA256;
memcpy(pcr_ext_cmd.digests.digests[0].digest.sha256, in_digest,
sizeof(pcr_ext_cmd.digests.digests[0].digest.sha256));
response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_PCR_Extend, &pcr_ext_cmd);
printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s: response is %x\n",
__func__, response ? response->hdr.tpm_code : -1);
if (!response || response->hdr.tpm_code)
return TPM_E_IOERROR;
tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
return TPM_SUCCESS;
}
uint32_t tlcl_finalize_physical_presence(void)
{
/* Nothing needs to be done with tpm2. */
printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s:%s:%d\n", __FILE__, __func__, __LINE__);
return TPM_SUCCESS;
}
uint32_t tlcl_force_clear(void)
{
tpm2: add tlcl_force_clear and use it before factory init tlcl_force_clear() needs to be issued each time when the device mode switches between normal/development/recovery. This patch adds command implementation using TPM_Clear TPM2 command, and also invokes it before factory initialization. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=verified that TPM_Clear command succeeds at factory startup and the boot proceeds normally. Change-Id: Ia431390870cbe448bc1b6f1755ed17953be9bdf1 Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: 347ff17b97da45fa4df547ff32f9dd2c8972cefd Original-Change-Id: I2a0e62527ad46f9dd060afe5e75c7e4d56752849 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/358095 Original-Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Darren Krahn <dkrahn@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15636 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-07-04 00:56:41 +02:00
struct tpm2_response *response;
response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_Clear, NULL);
printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s: response is %x\n",
__func__, response ? response->hdr.tpm_code : -1);
if (!response || response->hdr.tpm_code)
return TPM_E_IOERROR;
tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
return TPM_SUCCESS;
}
uint32_t tlcl_get_flags(uint8_t *disable, uint8_t *deactivated,
uint8_t *nvlocked)
{
/*
* TPM2 does not map directly into these flags TPM1.2 based firmware
* expects to be able to retrieve.
*
* In any case, if any of these conditions are present, the following
* firmware flow would be interrupted and will have a chance to report
* an error. Let's just hardcode an "All OK" response for now.
*/
if (disable)
*disable = 0;
if (nvlocked)
*nvlocked = 1;
if (deactivated)
*deactivated = 0;
return TPM_SUCCESS;
}
lib/tlcl: Ensure tlcl library is initialized only once Since tlcl library is used other than just vboot driver, ensure that the library is initialized only once per stage. BUG=chrome-os-partner:59355 BRANCH=None TEST=Verified in recovery mode on reef, tlcl library is initialized only once in romstage. Change-Id: I6245fe9ed34f5c174341b7eea8db456b45113287 Signed-off-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/17364 Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <paulepanter@users.sourceforge.net>
2016-11-10 18:49:05 +01:00
static uint8_t tlcl_init_done CAR_GLOBAL;
/* This function is called directly by vboot, uses vboot return types. */
tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
uint32_t tlcl_lib_init(void)
{
lib/tlcl: Ensure tlcl library is initialized only once Since tlcl library is used other than just vboot driver, ensure that the library is initialized only once per stage. BUG=chrome-os-partner:59355 BRANCH=None TEST=Verified in recovery mode on reef, tlcl library is initialized only once in romstage. Change-Id: I6245fe9ed34f5c174341b7eea8db456b45113287 Signed-off-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/17364 Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <paulepanter@users.sourceforge.net>
2016-11-10 18:49:05 +01:00
uint8_t done = car_get_var(tlcl_init_done);
if (done)
return VB2_SUCCESS;
tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
if (tis_init())
return VB2_ERROR_UNKNOWN;
if (tis_open())
return VB2_ERROR_UNKNOWN;
lib/tlcl: Ensure tlcl library is initialized only once Since tlcl library is used other than just vboot driver, ensure that the library is initialized only once per stage. BUG=chrome-os-partner:59355 BRANCH=None TEST=Verified in recovery mode on reef, tlcl library is initialized only once in romstage. Change-Id: I6245fe9ed34f5c174341b7eea8db456b45113287 Signed-off-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/17364 Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <paulepanter@users.sourceforge.net>
2016-11-10 18:49:05 +01:00
car_set_var(tlcl_init_done, 1);
tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
return VB2_SUCCESS;
}
uint32_t tlcl_physical_presence_cmd_enable(void)
{
printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s:%s:%d\n", __FILE__, __func__, __LINE__);
return TPM_SUCCESS;
}
uint32_t tlcl_read(uint32_t index, void *data, uint32_t length)
{
struct tpm2_nv_read_cmd nv_readc;
struct tpm2_response *response;
memset(&nv_readc, 0, sizeof(nv_readc));
nv_readc.nvIndex = HR_NV_INDEX + index;
nv_readc.size = length;
response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_NV_Read, &nv_readc);
/* Need to map tpm error codes into internal values. */
if (!response)
return TPM_E_READ_FAILURE;
printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s:%d index %#x return code %x\n",
__FILE__, __LINE__, index, response->hdr.tpm_code);
switch (response->hdr.tpm_code) {
case 0:
break;
cr50: process uninitialized values gracefully The vboot code tries reading rollback protection indices from the TPM, and if the attempt to read returns TPM_E_BADINDEX, it decides that the TPM has not yet been initialized for the Chromebook use, and needs to be taken through the factory initialization sequence. TPM_E_BADINDEX is an internal representation of the TPM error 0x28b, generated on attempts to read a non existing NVMEM space. If the space exists, but has never been written the TPM returns error 0x14a. This condition (the space exists but not written) could happen if the previous factory initialization attempt was interrupted right after the space was created. Let's map this error to the same internal representation (TPM_E_BADINDEX) so that the Chrome OS device could recover when this condition occurs. BRANCH=reef, gru BUG=b:37443842 TEST=verified that the Pyro device stuck in TPM error state recovered when this patch was applied. Change-Id: I6ff976c839efcd23ae26cef3ee428e7ae02e68f8 Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/20299 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
2017-06-21 21:23:22 +02:00
/* Uninitialized, returned if the space hasn't been written. */
case TPM_RC_NV_UNINITIALIZED:
/*
* Bad index, cr50 specific value, returned if the space
* hasn't been defined.
*/
case TPM_RC_CR50_NV_UNDEFINED:
tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
return TPM_E_BADINDEX;
default:
return TPM_E_READ_FAILURE;
}
if (length > response->nvr.buffer.t.size)
return TPM_E_RESPONSE_TOO_LARGE;
if (length < response->nvr.buffer.t.size)
return TPM_E_READ_EMPTY;
memcpy(data, response->nvr.buffer.t.buffer, length);
return TPM_SUCCESS;
}
uint32_t tlcl_self_test_full(void)
{
struct tpm2_self_test st;
struct tpm2_response *response;
st.yes_no = 1;
response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_SelfTest, &st);
printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s: response is %x\n",
__func__, response ? response->hdr.tpm_code : -1);
return TPM_SUCCESS;
}
uint32_t tlcl_set_deactivated(uint8_t flag)
{
printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s:%s:%d\n", __FILE__, __func__, __LINE__);
return TPM_SUCCESS;
}
uint32_t tlcl_set_enable(void)
{
printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s:%s:%d\n", __FILE__, __func__, __LINE__);
return TPM_SUCCESS;
}
tpm2: implement locking firmware rollback counter TPM1.2 is using the somewhat misnamed tlcl_set_global_lock() command function to lock the hardware rollback counter. For TPM2 let's implement and use the TPM2 command to lock an NV Ram location (TPM2_NV_WriteLock). BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=verified that TPM2_NV_WriteLock command is invoked before RO firmware starts RW, and succeeds. Change-Id: I52aa8db95b908488ec4cf0843afeb6310dc7f38b Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: 2f859335dfccfeea900f15bbb8c6cb3fd5ec8c77 Original-Change-Id: I62f22b9991522d4309cccc44180a5ebd4dca488d Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/358097 Original-Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Darren Krahn <dkrahn@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15638 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Patrick Georgi <pgeorgi@google.com>
2016-07-04 02:08:10 +02:00
uint32_t tlcl_lock_nv_write(uint32_t index)
tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
{
tpm2: implement locking firmware rollback counter TPM1.2 is using the somewhat misnamed tlcl_set_global_lock() command function to lock the hardware rollback counter. For TPM2 let's implement and use the TPM2 command to lock an NV Ram location (TPM2_NV_WriteLock). BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=verified that TPM2_NV_WriteLock command is invoked before RO firmware starts RW, and succeeds. Change-Id: I52aa8db95b908488ec4cf0843afeb6310dc7f38b Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: 2f859335dfccfeea900f15bbb8c6cb3fd5ec8c77 Original-Change-Id: I62f22b9991522d4309cccc44180a5ebd4dca488d Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/358097 Original-Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Darren Krahn <dkrahn@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15638 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Patrick Georgi <pgeorgi@google.com>
2016-07-04 02:08:10 +02:00
struct tpm2_response *response;
/* TPM Wll reject attempts to write at non-defined index. */
struct tpm2_nv_write_lock_cmd nv_wl = {
.nvIndex = HR_NV_INDEX + index,
};
response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_NV_WriteLock, &nv_wl);
printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s: response is %x\n",
__func__, response ? response->hdr.tpm_code : -1);
if (!response || response->hdr.tpm_code)
return TPM_E_IOERROR;
tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
return TPM_SUCCESS;
}
uint32_t tlcl_startup(void)
{
TPM2: Fill in empty tlcl_resume function in TPM2 tlcl On resume, TPM2_Starup(STATE) command needs to be sent to the TPM. This ensures that TPM restores the state saved at last Shutdown(STATE). Since tlcl_resume and tlcl_startup both use the same sequence for sending startup command with different arguments, add a common function that can be used by both. BUG=chrome-os-partner:58043 BRANCH=None TEST=Verified that on resume coreboot no longer complains about index read for 0x1007. Return value is 0 as expected. Change-Id: Ib8640acc9cc9cdb3ba5d40e0ccee5ca7d67fa645 Signed-off-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/16832 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org>
2016-09-30 21:53:19 +02:00
return tlcl_send_startup(TPM_SU_CLEAR);
tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
}
uint32_t tlcl_write(uint32_t index, const void *data, uint32_t length)
{
struct tpm2_nv_write_cmd nv_writec;
struct tpm2_response *response;
memset(&nv_writec, 0, sizeof(nv_writec));
nv_writec.nvIndex = HR_NV_INDEX + index;
nv_writec.data.t.size = length;
nv_writec.data.t.buffer = data;
response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_NV_Write, &nv_writec);
tpm2: fix tpm_write() error reporting The code misses the cases when a response was received but the command failed. This patch fixes the problem. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=none Change-Id: I3d50a4b67e3592bb80d2524a7c7f264fddbd34ae Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: 8f4d6185e13beead7156027e1cb40f7944e46569 Original-Change-Id: I914ab6509d3ab2082152652205802201a6637fcc Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/358096 Original-Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15637 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-07-06 07:30:16 +02:00
printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s: response is %x\n",
__func__, response ? response->hdr.tpm_code : -1);
tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
/* Need to map tpm error codes into internal values. */
tpm2: fix tpm_write() error reporting The code misses the cases when a response was received but the command failed. This patch fixes the problem. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=none Change-Id: I3d50a4b67e3592bb80d2524a7c7f264fddbd34ae Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: 8f4d6185e13beead7156027e1cb40f7944e46569 Original-Change-Id: I914ab6509d3ab2082152652205802201a6637fcc Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/358096 Original-Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15637 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-07-06 07:30:16 +02:00
if (!response || response->hdr.tpm_code)
tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
return TPM_E_WRITE_FAILURE;
return TPM_SUCCESS;
}
tpm2: use pcr0 dependent nvram space policy definitions The TPM2 specification allows defining NV ram spaces in a manner that makes it impossible to remove the space until a certain PCR is in a certain state. This comes in handy when defining spaces for rollback counters: make their removal depend on PCR0 being in the default state. Then extend PCR0 to any value. This guarantees that the spaces can not be deleted. Also, there is no need t create firmware and kernel rollback spaces with different privileges: they both can be created with the same set of properties, the firmware space could be locked by the RO firmware, and the kernel space could be locked by the RW firmware thus providing necessary privilege levels. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645, chrome-os-partner:55063 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied it is possible to boot into Chrome OS maintaining two rollback counter spaces in the TPM NV ram locked at different phases of the boot process. Change-Id: I889b2c4c4831ae01c093f33c09b4d98a11d758da Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: 36317f5e85107b1b2e732a5bb2a38295120560cd Original-Change-Id: I69e5ada65a5f15a8c04be9def92a8e1f4b753d9a Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/358094 Original-Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15635 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-07-04 00:24:23 +02:00
uint32_t tlcl_define_space(uint32_t space_index, size_t space_size)
tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
{
struct tpm2_nv_define_space_cmd nvds_cmd;
struct tpm2_response *response;
tpm2: use pcr0 dependent nvram space policy definitions The TPM2 specification allows defining NV ram spaces in a manner that makes it impossible to remove the space until a certain PCR is in a certain state. This comes in handy when defining spaces for rollback counters: make their removal depend on PCR0 being in the default state. Then extend PCR0 to any value. This guarantees that the spaces can not be deleted. Also, there is no need t create firmware and kernel rollback spaces with different privileges: they both can be created with the same set of properties, the firmware space could be locked by the RO firmware, and the kernel space could be locked by the RW firmware thus providing necessary privilege levels. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645, chrome-os-partner:55063 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied it is possible to boot into Chrome OS maintaining two rollback counter spaces in the TPM NV ram locked at different phases of the boot process. Change-Id: I889b2c4c4831ae01c093f33c09b4d98a11d758da Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: 36317f5e85107b1b2e732a5bb2a38295120560cd Original-Change-Id: I69e5ada65a5f15a8c04be9def92a8e1f4b753d9a Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/358094 Original-Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15635 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-07-04 00:24:23 +02:00
/*
lib/tpm2: do not create all NVRAM spaces with the same set of attributes The TPM spaces created by the RO need to have different attributes depending on the space's use. The firmware rollback counter and MRC hash spaces are created by the RO code and need to be protected at the highest level: it should be impossible to delete or modify the space once the RO exits, and it is how it is done before this patch. The rest of the spaces should be possible to modify or recreate even after the RO exits. Let's use different set of NVRAM space attributes to achieve that, and set the 'pcr0 unchanged' policy only for the firmware counter and MRC cache spaces. The definitions of the attributes can be found in "Trusted Platform Module Library Part 2: Structures", Revision 01.16, section "13.2 TPMA_NV (NV Index Attributes)." CQ-DEPEND=CL:410127 BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:59651 TEST=verified that the reef system boots fine in both normal and recovery modes; using tpmc confirmed that firmware, kernel and MRC cache NVRAM spaces are readable in both and writeable only in recovery mode. Change-Id: I1a1d2459f56ec929c9a92b39175888b8d1bcda55 Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/17388 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <paulepanter@users.sourceforge.net> Reviewed-by: Andrey Pronin <apronin@chromium.org>
2016-11-11 18:36:50 +01:00
* Different sets of NVRAM space attributes apply to the "ro" spaces,
* i.e. those which should not be possible to delete or modify once
* the RO exits, and the rest of the NVRAM spaces.
tpm2: use pcr0 dependent nvram space policy definitions The TPM2 specification allows defining NV ram spaces in a manner that makes it impossible to remove the space until a certain PCR is in a certain state. This comes in handy when defining spaces for rollback counters: make their removal depend on PCR0 being in the default state. Then extend PCR0 to any value. This guarantees that the spaces can not be deleted. Also, there is no need t create firmware and kernel rollback spaces with different privileges: they both can be created with the same set of properties, the firmware space could be locked by the RO firmware, and the kernel space could be locked by the RW firmware thus providing necessary privilege levels. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645, chrome-os-partner:55063 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied it is possible to boot into Chrome OS maintaining two rollback counter spaces in the TPM NV ram locked at different phases of the boot process. Change-Id: I889b2c4c4831ae01c093f33c09b4d98a11d758da Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: 36317f5e85107b1b2e732a5bb2a38295120560cd Original-Change-Id: I69e5ada65a5f15a8c04be9def92a8e1f4b753d9a Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/358094 Original-Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15635 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-07-04 00:24:23 +02:00
*/
lib/tpm2: do not create all NVRAM spaces with the same set of attributes The TPM spaces created by the RO need to have different attributes depending on the space's use. The firmware rollback counter and MRC hash spaces are created by the RO code and need to be protected at the highest level: it should be impossible to delete or modify the space once the RO exits, and it is how it is done before this patch. The rest of the spaces should be possible to modify or recreate even after the RO exits. Let's use different set of NVRAM space attributes to achieve that, and set the 'pcr0 unchanged' policy only for the firmware counter and MRC cache spaces. The definitions of the attributes can be found in "Trusted Platform Module Library Part 2: Structures", Revision 01.16, section "13.2 TPMA_NV (NV Index Attributes)." CQ-DEPEND=CL:410127 BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:59651 TEST=verified that the reef system boots fine in both normal and recovery modes; using tpmc confirmed that firmware, kernel and MRC cache NVRAM spaces are readable in both and writeable only in recovery mode. Change-Id: I1a1d2459f56ec929c9a92b39175888b8d1bcda55 Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/17388 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <paulepanter@users.sourceforge.net> Reviewed-by: Andrey Pronin <apronin@chromium.org>
2016-11-11 18:36:50 +01:00
const TPMA_NV ro_space_attributes = {
.TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1,
.TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1,
.TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1,
.TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1,
.TPMA_NV_WRITE_STCLEAR = 1,
.TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE = 1,
};
const TPMA_NV default_space_attributes = {
.TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1,
.TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1,
.TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1,
.TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1,
tpm2: use pcr0 dependent nvram space policy definitions The TPM2 specification allows defining NV ram spaces in a manner that makes it impossible to remove the space until a certain PCR is in a certain state. This comes in handy when defining spaces for rollback counters: make their removal depend on PCR0 being in the default state. Then extend PCR0 to any value. This guarantees that the spaces can not be deleted. Also, there is no need t create firmware and kernel rollback spaces with different privileges: they both can be created with the same set of properties, the firmware space could be locked by the RO firmware, and the kernel space could be locked by the RW firmware thus providing necessary privilege levels. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645, chrome-os-partner:55063 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied it is possible to boot into Chrome OS maintaining two rollback counter spaces in the TPM NV ram locked at different phases of the boot process. Change-Id: I889b2c4c4831ae01c093f33c09b4d98a11d758da Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: 36317f5e85107b1b2e732a5bb2a38295120560cd Original-Change-Id: I69e5ada65a5f15a8c04be9def92a8e1f4b753d9a Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/358094 Original-Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15635 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-07-04 00:24:23 +02:00
};
tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
/* Prepare the define space command structure. */
memset(&nvds_cmd, 0, sizeof(nvds_cmd));
nvds_cmd.publicInfo.dataSize = space_size;
nvds_cmd.publicInfo.nvIndex = HR_NV_INDEX + space_index;
nvds_cmd.publicInfo.nameAlg = TPM_ALG_SHA256;
lib/tpm2: do not create all NVRAM spaces with the same set of attributes The TPM spaces created by the RO need to have different attributes depending on the space's use. The firmware rollback counter and MRC hash spaces are created by the RO code and need to be protected at the highest level: it should be impossible to delete or modify the space once the RO exits, and it is how it is done before this patch. The rest of the spaces should be possible to modify or recreate even after the RO exits. Let's use different set of NVRAM space attributes to achieve that, and set the 'pcr0 unchanged' policy only for the firmware counter and MRC cache spaces. The definitions of the attributes can be found in "Trusted Platform Module Library Part 2: Structures", Revision 01.16, section "13.2 TPMA_NV (NV Index Attributes)." CQ-DEPEND=CL:410127 BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:59651 TEST=verified that the reef system boots fine in both normal and recovery modes; using tpmc confirmed that firmware, kernel and MRC cache NVRAM spaces are readable in both and writeable only in recovery mode. Change-Id: I1a1d2459f56ec929c9a92b39175888b8d1bcda55 Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/17388 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <paulepanter@users.sourceforge.net> Reviewed-by: Andrey Pronin <apronin@chromium.org>
2016-11-11 18:36:50 +01:00
/* RO only NV spaces should be impossible to destroy. */
if ((space_index == FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX) ||
(space_index == REC_HASH_NV_INDEX)) {
/*
* This policy digest was obtained using TPM2_PolicyPCR
* selecting only PCR_0 with a value of all zeros.
*/
const uint8_t pcr0_unchanged_policy[] = {
0x09, 0x93, 0x3C, 0xCE, 0xEB, 0xB4, 0x41, 0x11,
0x18, 0x81, 0x1D, 0xD4, 0x47, 0x78, 0x80, 0x08,
0x88, 0x86, 0x62, 0x2D, 0xD7, 0x79, 0x94, 0x46,
0x62, 0x26, 0x68, 0x8E, 0xEE, 0xE6, 0x6A, 0xA1
};
nvds_cmd.publicInfo.attributes = ro_space_attributes;
/*
* Use policy digest based on default pcr0 value. This makes
* sure that the space can not be deleted as soon as PCR0
* value has been extended from default.
*/
nvds_cmd.publicInfo.authPolicy.t.buffer = pcr0_unchanged_policy;
src/lib: Wrap lines at 80 columns Fix the following warning detected by checkpatch.pl: WARNING: line over 80 characters TEST=Build and run on Galileo Gen2 Change-Id: I5fa3f8e950e2f0c60bd0e8f030342dc8c0469299 Signed-off-by: Lee Leahy <Leroy.P.Leahy@intel.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/18758 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@google.com>
2017-03-11 00:23:24 +01:00
nvds_cmd.publicInfo.authPolicy.t.size =
sizeof(pcr0_unchanged_policy);
lib/tpm2: do not create all NVRAM spaces with the same set of attributes The TPM spaces created by the RO need to have different attributes depending on the space's use. The firmware rollback counter and MRC hash spaces are created by the RO code and need to be protected at the highest level: it should be impossible to delete or modify the space once the RO exits, and it is how it is done before this patch. The rest of the spaces should be possible to modify or recreate even after the RO exits. Let's use different set of NVRAM space attributes to achieve that, and set the 'pcr0 unchanged' policy only for the firmware counter and MRC cache spaces. The definitions of the attributes can be found in "Trusted Platform Module Library Part 2: Structures", Revision 01.16, section "13.2 TPMA_NV (NV Index Attributes)." CQ-DEPEND=CL:410127 BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:59651 TEST=verified that the reef system boots fine in both normal and recovery modes; using tpmc confirmed that firmware, kernel and MRC cache NVRAM spaces are readable in both and writeable only in recovery mode. Change-Id: I1a1d2459f56ec929c9a92b39175888b8d1bcda55 Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/17388 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <paulepanter@users.sourceforge.net> Reviewed-by: Andrey Pronin <apronin@chromium.org>
2016-11-11 18:36:50 +01:00
} else {
nvds_cmd.publicInfo.attributes = default_space_attributes;
}
tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_NV_DefineSpace, &nvds_cmd);
printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s: response is %x\n",
__func__, response ? response->hdr.tpm_code : -1);
if (!response)
return TPM_E_NO_DEVICE;
vboot: TPM2 - report attempts to re-create NVRAM spaces Currently the tlcl_define_space() function returns the same error value for any non-zero TPM response code. The thing is that the caller might want to allow attempts to re-create existing NVRAM spaces. This patch adds a new API return value to indicate this condition and uses it as appropriate. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:59654 TEST=for test purposes modified the code not to create the firmware space, wiped out the TPM NVRAM and booted the device. Observed it create kernel and MRC index spaces on the first boot and then reporting return code 0x14c for already existing spaces on the following restarts. Change-Id: Ic183eb45e73edfbccf11cc19fd2f64f64274bfb2 Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/17422 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
2016-11-11 23:15:31 +01:00
/* Map TPM2 retrun codes into common vboot represenation. */
src/lib: Add space before ( Fix the following error detected by checkpatch.pl: ERROR: space required before the open parenthesis '(' TEST=Build and run on Galileo Gen2 Change-Id: I8953fecbe75136ff989c9e3cf6c5e155dcee3c3b Signed-off-by: Lee Leahy <Leroy.P.Leahy@intel.com> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/18698 Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philippe.mathieu.daude@gmail.com> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Arthur Heymans <arthur@aheymans.xyz>
2017-03-09 03:02:24 +01:00
switch (response->hdr.tpm_code) {
vboot: TPM2 - report attempts to re-create NVRAM spaces Currently the tlcl_define_space() function returns the same error value for any non-zero TPM response code. The thing is that the caller might want to allow attempts to re-create existing NVRAM spaces. This patch adds a new API return value to indicate this condition and uses it as appropriate. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:59654 TEST=for test purposes modified the code not to create the firmware space, wiped out the TPM NVRAM and booted the device. Observed it create kernel and MRC index spaces on the first boot and then reporting return code 0x14c for already existing spaces on the following restarts. Change-Id: Ic183eb45e73edfbccf11cc19fd2f64f64274bfb2 Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/17422 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
2016-11-11 23:15:31 +01:00
case TPM2_RC_SUCCESS:
return TPM_SUCCESS;
case TPM2_RC_NV_DEFINED:
return TPM_E_NV_DEFINED;
default:
return TPM_E_INTERNAL_INCONSISTENCY;
}
tpm2: implement tlcl layer This is the first approximation of implementing TPM2 support in coreboot. It is very clearly incomplete, some of the larger missing pieces being: - PCR(s) modification - protection NVRAM spaces from unauthorized deletion/modification. - resume handling - cr50 specific factory initialization The existing TPM1.2 firmware API is being implemented for TPM2. Some functions are not required at all, some do not map fully, but the API is not yet being changed, many functions are just stubs. An addition to the API is the new tlcl_define_space() function. It abstracts TMP internals allowing the caller to specify the privilege level of the space to be defined. Two privilege levels are defined, higher for the RO firmware and lower for RW firmware, they determine who can write into the spaces. BRANCH=none BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645 TEST=with the rest of the patches applied Kevin/Gru devices can initialize and use firmware and kernel spaces Change-Id: Ife3301cf161ce38d61f11e4b60f1b43cab9a4eba Signed-off-by: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Commit-Id: bcc8e62604c705798ca106e7995a0960b92b3f35 Original-Change-Id: Ib340fa8e7db51c10e5080973c16a19b0ebbb61e6 Original-Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353914 Original-Commit-Ready: Martin Roth <martinroth@chromium.org> Original-Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/15569 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@googlemail.com>
2016-04-06 01:01:57 +02:00
}
google/chromeos: disable platform hierarchy on resume for TPM2 On Chrome OS devices that use TPM2 parts the platform hierarchy is disabled by the boot loader, depthcharge. Since the bootloader isn't involved in resuming a suspended machine there's no equivalent action in coreboot to disable the platform hierarchy. Therefore, to ensure consistent state in resume the platform hierarchy in the TPM2 needs to be disabled as well. For systems that resume using the firmware the platform hierarchy is disabled when utilizing TPM2 devices. BUG=chrome-os-partner:61097 BRANCH=reef TEST=Suspend and resume. Confirmed 'stop trunksd; tpmc getvf; start trunksd' shows that phEnable is 0. Change-Id: I060252f338c8fd68389273224ee58caa99881de8 Signed-off-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/18096 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <paulepanter@users.sourceforge.net> Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org>
2017-01-11 00:44:42 +01:00
uint32_t tlcl_disable_platform_hierarchy(void)
{
struct tpm2_response *response;
struct tpm2_hierarchy_control_cmd hc = {
.enable = TPM_RH_PLATFORM,
.state = 0,
};
response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_Hierarchy_Control, &hc);
if (!response || response->hdr.tpm_code)
return TPM_E_INTERNAL_INCONSISTENCY;
return TPM_SUCCESS;
}
vboot/tpm2: enable nvmem commits on cr50 when writing firmware secdata cr50 by default delays nvmem commits internally from the point of reset to accumulate change state. However, the factory process can put a board into dev mode through the recovery screen. This state is stored in the TPM's nvmem space. When the factory process is complete a disable_dev_request and battery_cutoff_request is performed. This leads to disabling the dev mode in TPM, but the battery is subsequently cut off so the nvmem contents never stick. Therefore, whenever antirollback_write_space_firmware() is called we know there was a change in secdata so request cr50 to immediately enable nvmem commits going forward. This allows state changes to happen immediately. The fallout from this is that when secdata is changed that current boot will take longer because every transaction that writes to TPM nvmem space will perform a write synchronously. All subsequent boots do not have that effect. It should also be noted that this approach to the implementation is a pretty severe layering violation. However, the current TPM APIs don't lend themselves well to extending commands or re-using code outside of the current routines which inherently assume all knowledge of every command (in conflict with vendor commands since those are vendor-specific by definition). BUG=b:35775104 BRANCH=reef TEST=Confirmed disablement of dev mode sticks in the presence of: crossystem disable_dev_request=1; crossystem battery_cutoff_request=1; reboot; Change-Id: I3395db9cbdfea45da1f5cb994c6570978593b944 Signed-off-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/18681 Reviewed-by: Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@chromium.org> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins)
2017-03-08 18:23:11 +01:00
uint32_t tlcl_cr50_enable_nvcommits(void)
{
uint16_t sub_command = TPM2_CR50_SUB_CMD_NVMEM_ENABLE_COMMITS;
struct tpm2_response *response;
printk(BIOS_INFO, "Enabling cr50 nvmem commmits\n");
response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_CR50_VENDOR_COMMAND, &sub_command);
if (response == NULL || (response && response->hdr.tpm_code)) {
if (response)
printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s: failed %x\n", __func__,
response->hdr.tpm_code);
else
printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s: failed\n", __func__);
return TPM_E_IOERROR;
}
return TPM_SUCCESS;
}
cr50: add unmarshaling of vendor commands and process 'enable_update' The upcoming Cr50 firmware changes will require the AP to enable the previously downloaded Cr50 firmware update(s). A new vendor command (TPM2_CR50_SUB_CMD_TURN_UPDATE_ON) is used for that. The command accepts one parameter - a timeout value in range of 0 to 1000 ms. When processing the command the Cr50 checks if the alternative RO or RW image(s) need to be enabled, and if so - enables them and returns to the host the number of enabled headers. If the vendor command requested a non-zero timeout, the Cr50 starts a timer to trigger system reboot after the requested timeout expires. The host acts on the number of enabled headers - if the number is nonzero, the host prepares the device to be reset and waits for the Cr50 to reboot the device after timeout expires. This patch also adds more formal vendor command marshaling/unmarshaling to make future additions easier. BRANCH=gru,reef BUG=b:35580805 TEST=with the actual user of this code in the next patch verified that the cr50 update is enabled as expected. Change-Id: Ic76d384d637c0eeaad206e0a8242cbb8e2b19b37 Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/18945 Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <paulepanter@users.sourceforge.net> Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
2017-03-23 00:01:53 +01:00
uint32_t tlcl_cr50_enable_update(uint16_t timeout_ms,
uint8_t *num_restored_headers)
{
struct tpm2_response *response;
uint16_t command_body[] = {
TPM2_CR50_SUB_CMD_TURN_UPDATE_ON, timeout_ms
};
printk(BIOS_INFO, "Checking cr50 for pending updates\n");
response = tpm_process_command(TPM2_CR50_VENDOR_COMMAND, command_body);
if (!response || response->hdr.tpm_code)
return TPM_E_INTERNAL_INCONSISTENCY;
*num_restored_headers = response->vcr.num_restored_headers;
return TPM_SUCCESS;
}
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