security/vboot: Add support for GSCVD (Google "RO verification")
This patch adds a new CONFIG_VBOOT_GSCVD option that will be enabled by default for TPM_GOOGLE_TI50 devices. It makes the build system run the `futility gscvd` command to create a GSCVD (GSC verification data) which signs the CBFS trust anchor (bootblock and GBB). In order for this to work, boards will need to have an RO_GSCVD section in their FMAP, and production boards should override the CONFIG_VBOOT_GSC_BOARD_ID option with the correct ID for each variant. BUG=b:229015103 Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Change-Id: I1cf86e90b2687e81edadcefa5a8826b02fbc8b24 Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/64707 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Yu-Ping Wu <yupingso@google.com>
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@ -244,6 +244,10 @@ config VBOOT
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select VBOOT_EARLY_EC_SYNC if !BOARD_GOOGLE_BASEBOARD_NISSA
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select VBOOT_LID_SWITCH
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config VBOOT_GSC_BOARD_ID
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string
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default "LBTV" if BOARD_GOOGLE_JOXER
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config DIMM_SPD_SIZE
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default 512
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@ -78,6 +78,11 @@ config VBOOT
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select VBOOT_SEPARATE_VERSTAGE
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select VBOOT_STARTS_IN_BOOTBLOCK
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# TODO: Remove once CBFS verification on AMD has been fixed.
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config VBOOT_GSCVD
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bool
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default n
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if !EM100 # EM100 defaults in soc/amd/common/blocks/spi/Kconfig
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config EFS_SPI_READ_MODE
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default 2 # Dual IO (1-1-2)
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@ -135,6 +135,10 @@ config CHROMEOS
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select VBOOT_EARLY_EC_SYNC
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select VBOOT_LID_SWITCH
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config VBOOT_GSCVD
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bool
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default n
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config CHROMEOS_WIFI_SAR
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bool "Enable SAR options for Chrome OS build"
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depends on CHROMEOS
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@ -290,6 +290,37 @@ config VBOOT_DEFINE_WIDEVINE_COUNTERS
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config will only define the counter space. Counters need to be incremented
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separately before any read operation is performed on them.
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config VBOOT_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE
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hex
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default 0x400
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help
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Set the default hash size. Generally 1k is reasonable, but in some
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cases it may improve hashing speed to increase the size.
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Note that this buffer is allocated in the stack. Although the
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build should fail if the stack size is exceeded, it's something to
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be aware of when changing the size.
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config VBOOT_GSCVD
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bool "Generate GSC verification data"
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depends on TPM_GOOGLE
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select CBFS_VERIFICATION
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default n if TPM_GOOGLE_CR50
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default y
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help
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Generate a Google Security Chip Verification Data (GSCVD) structure on the flash to
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allow the GSC to verify the CBFS verification anchor. Used by default with Ti50 GSCs.
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Requires an RO_GSCVD FMAP section.
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config VBOOT_GSC_BOARD_ID
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string
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depends on VBOOT_GSCVD
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default "ZZCR"
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help
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GSC board ID to be embedded in the GSCVD. Usually each specific mainboard variant
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has its own. Google engineers can find these in the go/cros-dlm database ("Products").
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(Note: This is a completely separate thing from coreboot's `board_id()` function.)
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menu "GBB configuration"
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config GBB_HWID
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@ -400,16 +431,21 @@ config VBOOT_KEYBLOCK_PREAMBLE_FLAGS
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hex "Keyblock preamble flags"
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default 0x0
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config VBOOT_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE
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hex
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default 0x400
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help
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Set the default hash size. Generally 1k is reasonable, but in some
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cases it may improve hashing speed to increase the size.
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if VBOOT_GSCVD
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Note that this buffer is allocated in the stack. Although the
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build should fail if the stack size is exceeded, it's something to
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be aware of when changing the size.
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config VBOOT_GSCVD_ROOT_PUBKEY
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string "GSCVD root key (public)"
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default "\$(VBOOT_SOURCE)/tests/devkeys/arv_root.vbpubk"
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config VBOOT_GSCVD_PLATFORM_PRIVKEY
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string "GSCVD platform key (private)"
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default "\$(VBOOT_SOURCE)/tests/devkeys/arv_platform.vbprivk"
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config VBOOT_GSCVD_PLATFORM_KEYBLOCK
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string "GSCVD platform keyblock (public)"
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default "\$(VBOOT_SOURCE)/tests/devkeys/arv_platform.keyblock"
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endif # VBOOT_GSCVD
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endmenu # Keys
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endif # VBOOT
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@ -294,6 +294,61 @@ build_complete::
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$(CBFSTOOL) $(obj)/coreboot.rom write -u -r SHARED_DATA -i 0 -f $(obj)/shared_data.region
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endif
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fmap-section-offset-cmd = $(FUTILITY) dump_fmap -p $(obj)/coreboot.rom | \
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grep '^$(1) ' | cut '-d ' -f2
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ifeq ($(CONFIG_VBOOT_GSCVD),y)
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#
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# vboot-gscvd-ranges
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#
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# This variable expands to the list of ranges that will be verified by the GSC
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# before releasing the SoC from reset. It needs to cover all security-relevant
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# ranges of the flash that CBFS verification cannot cover itself. By default
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# this is the `GBB` FMAP section (not handled here but through the special `-G`
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# parameter to `futility gscvd` below) and the bootblock. Here we are
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# initializing the variable to expansions that produce ranges for both the
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# `BOOTBLOCK` FMAP section (filled up to the real size of
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# `$(objcbfs)/bootblock.bin`) and the `bootblock` file in the primary CBFS --
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# only one of those two should normally exist on a given platform.
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#
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# Platforms where the bootblock isn't the first and only thing loaded by the
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# hardware or which otherwise have special security-relevant flash areas that
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# cannot be covered normally by CBFS verification will need to manually add
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# ranges to this variable in their own Makefiles, in the format produced by
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# printf("%x:%x", start_offset, size). The variable is only expanded once in a
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# recipe of the `files_added` target, so $(shell) expansions that depend on
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# inspecting $(obj)/coreboot.rom (or any of its dependencies) are valid.
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#
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vboot-gscvd-ranges += $(shell ( \
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offset=$$($(call fmap-section-offset-cmd,BOOTBLOCK)) ;\
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if [ -n "$$offset" ]; then \
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size=$$(wc -c < $(objcbfs)/bootblock.bin) ;\
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printf "%x:%x" $$offset $$size ;\
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fi ;\
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))
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vboot-gscvd-ranges += $(shell ( \
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line=$$($(CBFSTOOL) $(obj)/coreboot.rom print -k | grep '^bootblock[[:space:]]') ;\
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if [ -n "$$line" ]; then \
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cbfs_start=$$($(call fmap-section-offset-cmd,COREBOOT)) ;\
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offset=$$(printf "$$line" | cut -f2) ;\
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size=$$(printf "$$line" | cut -f6) ;\
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printf "%x:%x" $$((cbfs_start + offset)) $$size ;\
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fi ;\
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))
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files_added:: $(FUTILITY)
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@printf " WRITE GSCVD\n"
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gscvd_range_args="$(foreach range,$(vboot-gscvd-ranges),-R $(range))" ;\
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if [ -z "$$gscvd_range_args" ]; then \
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echo "ERROR: No valid GSCVD ranges detected in image!" ;\
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exit 1 ;\
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fi ;\
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$(FUTILITY) gscvd -G $$gscvd_range_args -b $(CONFIG_VBOOT_GSC_BOARD_ID) \
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-r "$(CONFIG_VBOOT_GSCVD_ROOT_PUBKEY)" \
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-p "$(CONFIG_VBOOT_GSCVD_PLATFORM_PRIVKEY)" \
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-k "$(CONFIG_VBOOT_GSCVD_PLATFORM_KEYBLOCK)" \
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$(obj)/coreboot.rom
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endif
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# Extract FW_MAIN_? region and minimize it if the last file is empty, so it
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# doesn't contain this empty file (that can have a significant size),
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# improving a lot on hash times due to a smaller amount of data loaded from
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