security/vboot: Limit vboot verification code access to only verstage
Make vboot verification code accessible in only verstage. Vboot verification code in vboot_logic.c is being used in verstage. Due to support function vboot_save_data(), so core functionality in vboot_logic.c is made available in romstage. The patch decouples the support function frm vboot_logic.c to limit itself to verstage. BUG=b:155544643 TEST=Verified on hatch Signed-off-by: Sridhar Siricilla <sridhar.siricilla@intel.com> Change-Id: Id1ede45c4dffe90afcef210eabaa657cf92a9335 Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/40562 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com> Reviewed-by: Rizwan Qureshi <rizwan.qureshi@intel.com>
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@ -112,16 +112,17 @@ verstage-$(CONFIG_VBOOT_SEPARATE_VERSTAGE) += verstage.c
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ifeq (${CONFIG_VBOOT_MOCK_SECDATA},y)
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verstage-y += secdata_mock.c
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romstage-y += secdata_mock.c
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ramstage-y += secdata_mock.c
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else
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verstage-y += secdata_tpm.c
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romstage-y += secdata_tpm.c
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ramstage-y += secdata_tpm.c
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endif
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ifneq ($(CONFIG_TPM1)$(CONFIG_TPM2),)
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verstage-y += tpm_common.c
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endif
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romstage-y += vboot_logic.c
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romstage-y += common.c
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ramstage-y += common.c
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@ -12,6 +12,31 @@
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#include <security/vboot/vbnv.h>
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#include <vb2_api.h>
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#include "antirollback.h"
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void vboot_save_data(struct vb2_context *ctx)
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{
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if (ctx->flags & VB2_CONTEXT_SECDATA_FIRMWARE_CHANGED &&
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(CONFIG(VBOOT_MOCK_SECDATA) || tlcl_lib_init() == VB2_SUCCESS)) {
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printk(BIOS_INFO, "Saving secdata firmware\n");
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antirollback_write_space_firmware(ctx);
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ctx->flags &= ~VB2_CONTEXT_SECDATA_FIRMWARE_CHANGED;
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}
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if (ctx->flags & VB2_CONTEXT_SECDATA_KERNEL_CHANGED &&
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(CONFIG(VBOOT_MOCK_SECDATA) || tlcl_lib_init() == VB2_SUCCESS)) {
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printk(BIOS_INFO, "Saving secdata kernel\n");
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antirollback_write_space_kernel(ctx);
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ctx->flags &= ~VB2_CONTEXT_SECDATA_KERNEL_CHANGED;
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}
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if (ctx->flags & VB2_CONTEXT_NVDATA_CHANGED) {
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printk(BIOS_INFO, "Saving nvdata\n");
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save_vbnv(ctx->nvdata);
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ctx->flags &= ~VB2_CONTEXT_NVDATA_CHANGED;
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}
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}
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/* Check if it is okay to enable USB Device Controller (UDC). */
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int vboot_can_enable_udc(void)
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{
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@ -209,28 +209,6 @@ static vb2_error_t hash_body(struct vb2_context *ctx,
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return VB2_SUCCESS;
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}
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void vboot_save_data(struct vb2_context *ctx)
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{
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if (ctx->flags & VB2_CONTEXT_SECDATA_FIRMWARE_CHANGED &&
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(CONFIG(VBOOT_MOCK_SECDATA) || tlcl_lib_init() == VB2_SUCCESS)) {
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printk(BIOS_INFO, "Saving secdata firmware\n");
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antirollback_write_space_firmware(ctx);
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ctx->flags &= ~VB2_CONTEXT_SECDATA_FIRMWARE_CHANGED;
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}
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if (ctx->flags & VB2_CONTEXT_SECDATA_KERNEL_CHANGED &&
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(CONFIG(VBOOT_MOCK_SECDATA) || tlcl_lib_init() == VB2_SUCCESS)) {
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printk(BIOS_INFO, "Saving secdata kernel\n");
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antirollback_write_space_kernel(ctx);
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ctx->flags &= ~VB2_CONTEXT_SECDATA_KERNEL_CHANGED;
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}
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if (ctx->flags & VB2_CONTEXT_NVDATA_CHANGED) {
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printk(BIOS_INFO, "Saving nvdata\n");
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save_vbnv(ctx->nvdata);
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ctx->flags &= ~VB2_CONTEXT_NVDATA_CHANGED;
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}
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}
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static uint32_t extend_pcrs(struct vb2_context *ctx)
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{
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