Documentation: Spell vboot all lowercase

Update all occurrences of vboot and spell it lowercase.

Change-Id: I432b0db8a3dda43b71844e557a3d89180f25f1c3
Signed-off-by: Patrick Rudolph <patrick.rudolph@9elements.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcello Sylvester Bauer <sylv@sylv.io>
Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/39799
Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Georgi <pgeorgi@google.com>

Documentation/drivers/smmstore.md

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ The API provides append-only semantics for key/value pairs.
 
 By default SMMSTORE will operate on a separate FMAP region called
 `SMMSTORE`. The default generated FMAP will include such a region.
-On systems with a locked FMAP, e.g. in an existing VBOOT setup
+On systems with a locked FMAP, e.g. in an existing vboot setup
 with a locked RO region, the option exists to add a cbfsfile
 called `smm_store` in the `RW_LEGACY` (if CHROMEOS) or in the
 `COREBOOT` FMAP regions. It is recommended for new builds using

Documentation/mainboard/index.md

@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ The boards in this section are not real mainboards, but emulators.
 - [R60](lenovo/r60.md)
 - [T4xx common](lenovo/t4xx_series.md)
 - [X2xx common](lenovo/x2xx_series.md)
-- [VBOOT](lenovo/vboot.md)
+- [vboot](lenovo/vboot.md)
 
 ### Arrandale series
 

Documentation/mainboard/lenovo/vboot.md

@@ -3,18 +3,18 @@
 By default a single instance of coreboot is present in the firmware flash,
 no verification is done and the flash is not write-protected, so as to allow
 firmware updates from the OS.
-The verified boot mechanism also called [VBOOT] allows secure firmware
+The verified boot mechanism also called [vboot] allows secure firmware
 updates using an A/B partitioning scheme once enabled.
 
-## Enabling VBOOT
+## Enabling vboot
-You can enable [VBOOT] in Kconfig's *Security* section. Besides a verified
+You can enable [vboot] in Kconfig's *Security* section. Besides a verified
 boot you can also enable a measured boot by setting
 `CONFIG_VBOOT_MEASURED_BOOT`. Both options need a working TPM, which is
 present on all recent Lenovo devices.
 
 ## Updating and recovery
 As the A/B partition is writeable you can still update them from the OS.
-By using the [VBOOT] mechanism you store a copy of coreboot in the `RO`
+By using the [vboot] mechanism you store a copy of coreboot in the `RO`
 partition that acts as failsafe in case the regular firmware update, that
 goes to the `A` or `B` partition fails.
 
@@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ default FMAP. They are missing the `B` partition, due to size constaints.
 You can still provide your own FMAP if you need `RO`+`A`+`B` partitions.
 
 ## CMOS
-[VBOOT] on *Lenovo* devices uses the CMOS to store configuration data, like
+[vboot] on *Lenovo* devices uses the CMOS to store configuration data, like
 boot failures and the last successfully booted partition.
 
-[VBOOT]: ../../security/vboot/index.md
 [CB:32705]: https://review.coreboot.org/32705
+[vboot]: ../../security/vboot/index.md

Documentation/releases/coreboot-4.11-relnotes.md

@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ of becoming more generally useful.
 Payload integration has been updated, coreinfo learned to cope with
 UPPER CASE commands and libpayload knows how to deal with USB3 hubs.
 
-### Added VBOOT support to the following platforms:
+### Added vboot support to the following platforms:
 
 * intel/gm45
 * intel/nehalem

Documentation/releases/coreboot-4.5-relnotes.md

@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ Areas with significant updates
 
 ### Vendorcode
 * AMD (14 commits) - Cleanup, add libagesa.a builds, remove unused code.
-* Google (22 commits) - VBoot2 updates and cleanup
+* Google (22 commits) - vboot2 updates and cleanup
 * Intel (86 commits) - Add Intel FSP 2.0, update Broadwell DE support
 
 ### Payloads (37 commits)

Documentation/releases/coreboot-4.6-relnotes.md

@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ SuperIO (12 commits)
 * Add 2 new chips
 * Consolidate code to use common routines
 
-Vboot (23 commits)
+vboot (23 commits)
 * Add support for recovery hash space in TPM
 
 RISC-V (25 commits)

Documentation/releases/coreboot-4.8.1-relnotes.md

@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ Security
 --------
 * Start of refactoring the TPM software stack
 * Introduced coreboot security section in kconfig
-* VBoot & TPM code moved into src/security
+* vboot & TPM code moved into src/security
 
 Intelmetool
 -----------

Documentation/security/vboot/index.md

@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ not into the read/write coreboot file systems in *FW_MAIN_A* and *FW_MAIN_B*.
 **VBOOT_ENABLE_CBFS_FALLBACK**  
 
 Normally coreboot will use the active read/write coreboot file system for all
-of it's file access when VBOOT is active and is not in recovery mode.
+of it's file access when vboot is active and is not in recovery mode.
 
 When the `VBOOT_ENABLE_CBFS_FALLBACK` option is enabled the cbfs file system will
 first try to locate a file in the active read/write file system. If the file

Documentation/security/vboot/list_vboot.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# VBOOT enabled devices
+# vboot-enabled devices
 
 ## Emulation
 - QEMU x86 i440fx/piix4 (aka qemu -M pc)

Documentation/security/vboot/measured_boot.md

@@ -120,12 +120,12 @@ PCR-7 are left empty.
 ### PCR-0
 _Hash:_ SHA1
 
-_Description:_ Google VBoot GBB flags.
+_Description:_ Google vboot GBB flags.
 
 ### PCR-1
 _Hash:_ SHA1/SHA256
 
-_Description:_ Google VBoot GBB HWID.
+_Description:_ Google vboot GBB HWID.
 
 ### PCR-2
 _Hash:_ SHA1/SHA256

util/vboot_list/vboot_list.sh

@@ -52,4 +52,4 @@ do
 done
 }
 
-(echo "# VBOOT enabled devices"; generate_vboot_list) > $OUTPUT_FILE
+(echo "# vboot-enabled devices"; generate_vboot_list) > $OUTPUT_FILE