106 lines
4.9 KiB
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106 lines
4.9 KiB
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Security Handling
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=================
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Security Disclosures
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--------------------
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We disclose all security vulnerabilities we find, or are advised about, that are
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relevant to Trusted Firmware-A. We encourage responsible disclosure of
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vulnerabilities and inform users as best we can about all possible issues.
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We disclose TF-A vulnerabilities as Security Advisories, all of which are listed
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at the bottom of this page. Any new ones will, additionally, be announced as
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issues in the project's `issue tracker`_ with the ``security-advisory`` tag. You
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can receive notification emails for these by watching the "Trusted Firmware-A"
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project at https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/.
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Found a Security Issue?
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-----------------------
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Although we try to keep TF-A secure, we can only do so with the help of the
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community of developers and security researchers.
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If you think you have found a security vulnerability, please **do not** report it
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in the `issue tracker`_. Instead send an email to
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trusted-firmware-security@arm.com
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Please include:
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* Trusted Firmware-A version (or commit) affected
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* A description of the concern or vulnerability
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* Details on how to replicate the vulnerability, including:
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- Configuration details
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- Proof of concept exploit code
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- Any additional software or tools required
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We recommend using `this PGP/GPG key`_ for encrypting the information. This key
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is also available at http://keyserver.pgp.com and LDAP port 389 of the same
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server. The fingerprint for this key is:
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::
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1309 2C19 22B4 8E87 F17B FE5C 3AB7 EFCB 45A0 DFD0
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If you would like replies to be encrypted, please provide your public key.
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Please give us the time to respond to you and fix the vulnerability before going
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public. We do our best to respond and fix any issues quickly. We also need to
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ensure providers of products that use TF-A have a chance to consider the
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implications of the vulnerability and its remedy.
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Afterwards, we encourage you to write-up your findings about the TF-A source
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code.
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Attribution
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-----------
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We will name and thank you in the ``change-log.rst`` distributed with the source
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code and in any published security advisory.
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Security Advisories
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-------------------
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+-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| ID | Title |
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+===========+==================================================================+
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| `TFV-1`_ | Malformed Firmware Update SMC can result in copy of unexpectedly |
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| | large data into secure memory |
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+-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| `TFV-2`_ | Enabled secure self-hosted invasive debug interface can allow |
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| | normal world to panic secure world |
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+-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| `TFV-3`_ | RO memory is always executable at AArch64 Secure EL1 |
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+-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| `TFV-4`_ | Malformed Firmware Update SMC can result in copy or |
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| | authentication of unexpected data in secure memory in AArch32 |
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| | state |
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+-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| `TFV-5`_ | Not initializing or saving/restoring PMCR_EL0 can leak secure |
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| | world timing information |
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+-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| `TFV-6`_ | Trusted Firmware-A exposure to speculative processor |
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| | vulnerabilities using cache timing side-channels |
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+-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| `TFV-7`_ | Trusted Firmware-A exposure to cache speculation vulnerability |
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| | Variant 4 |
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+-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| `TFV-8`_ | Not saving x0 to x3 registers can leak information from one |
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| | Normal World SMC client to another |
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+-----------+------------------------------------------------------------------+
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.. _issue tracker: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/project/board/1/
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.. _this PGP/GPG key: security-reporting.asc
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.. _TFV-1: ../security_advisories/security-advisory-tfv-1.rst
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.. _TFV-2: ../security_advisories/security-advisory-tfv-2.rst
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.. _TFV-3: ../security_advisories/security-advisory-tfv-3.rst
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.. _TFV-4: ../security_advisories/security-advisory-tfv-4.rst
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.. _TFV-5: ../security_advisories/security-advisory-tfv-5.rst
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.. _TFV-6: ../security_advisories/security-advisory-tfv-6.rst
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.. _TFV-7: ../security_advisories/security-advisory-tfv-7.rst
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.. _TFV-8: ../security_advisories/security-advisory-tfv-8.rst
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