coreboot-kgpe-d16/src/security/tpm/Kconfig

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# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
source "src/security/tpm/tss/vendor/cr50/Kconfig"
menu "Trusted Platform Module"
config TPM1
bool
default y if MAINBOARD_HAS_TPM1 || USER_TPM1
depends on MAINBOARD_HAS_LPC_TPM || \
MAINBOARD_HAS_I2C_TPM_GENERIC || \
MAINBOARD_HAS_I2C_TPM_ATMEL
config TPM2
bool
default y if MAINBOARD_HAS_TPM2 || USER_TPM2
depends on MAINBOARD_HAS_I2C_TPM_GENERIC || \
MAINBOARD_HAS_LPC_TPM || \
MAINBOARD_HAS_I2C_TPM_ATMEL || \
MAINBOARD_HAS_I2C_TPM_CR50 || \
MAINBOARD_HAS_SPI_TPM || \
MAINBOARD_HAS_CRB_TPM
config MAINBOARD_HAS_TPM1
bool
config MAINBOARD_HAS_TPM2
bool
if !MAINBOARD_HAS_TPM1 && !MAINBOARD_HAS_TPM2
choice
prompt "Trusted Platform Module"
default USER_NO_TPM
config USER_NO_TPM
bool "disabled"
config USER_TPM1
bool "1.2"
depends on MAINBOARD_HAS_LPC_TPM || \
MAINBOARD_HAS_I2C_TPM_GENERIC || \
MAINBOARD_HAS_I2C_TPM_ATMEL
help
Enable this option to enable TPM 1.0 - 1.2 support in coreboot.
If unsure, say N.
config USER_TPM2
bool "2.0"
depends on MAINBOARD_HAS_I2C_TPM_GENERIC || \
MAINBOARD_HAS_LPC_TPM || \
MAINBOARD_HAS_I2C_TPM_ATMEL || \
MAINBOARD_HAS_I2C_TPM_CR50 || \
MAINBOARD_HAS_SPI_TPM || \
MAINBOARD_HAS_CRB_TPM
help
Enable this option to enable TPM 2.0 support in coreboot.
If unsure, say N.
endchoice
endif
config TPM_DEACTIVATE
bool "Deactivate TPM"
default n
depends on !VBOOT
depends on TPM1
help
Deactivate TPM by issuing deactivate command.
config DEBUG_TPM
bool "Output verbose TPM debug messages"
default n
select DRIVER_TPM_DISPLAY_TIS_BYTES if I2C_TPM
depends on TPM1 || TPM2
help
This option enables additional TPM related debug messages.
config TPM_RDRESP_NEED_DELAY
bool "Enable Delay Workaround for TPM"
default n
depends on MAINBOARD_HAS_LPC_TPM
help
Certain TPMs seem to need some delay when reading response
to work around a race-condition-related issue, possibly
caused by ill-programmed TPM firmware.
config TPM_STARTUP_IGNORE_POSTINIT
bool
help
Select this to ignore POSTINIT INVALID return codes on TPM
startup. This is useful on platforms where a previous stage
issued a TPM startup. Examples of use cases are Intel TXT
or VBOOT on the Intel Arrandale processor, which issues a
CPU-only reset during the romstage.
security/vboot: Decouple measured boot from verified boot Currently, those who want to use measured boot implemented within vboot should enable verified boot first, along with sections such as GBB and RW slots defined with manually written fmd files, even if they do not actually want to verify anything. As discussed in CB:34977, measured boot should be decoupled from verified boot and make them two fully independent options. Crypto routines necessary for measurement could be reused, and TPM and CRTM init should be done somewhere other than vboot_logic_executed() if verified boot is not enabled. In this revision, only TCPA log is initialized during bootblock. Before TPM gets set up, digests are not measured into tpm immediately, but cached in TCPA log, and measured into determined PCRs right after TPM is up. This change allows those who do not want to use the verified boot scheme implemented by vboot as well as its requirement of a more complex partition scheme designed for chromeos to make use of the measured boot functionality implemented within vboot library to measure the boot process. TODO: Measure MRC Cache somewhere, as MRC Cache has never resided in CBFS any more, so it cannot be covered by tspi_measure_cbfs_hook(). Change-Id: I1fb376b4a8b98baffaee4d574937797bba1f8aee Signed-off-by: Bill XIE <persmule@hardenedlinux.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/35077 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Werner Zeh <werner.zeh@siemens.com>
2019-08-22 14:28:36 +02:00
config TPM_MEASURED_BOOT
bool "Enable Measured Boot"
default n
select VBOOT_LIB
depends on TPM1 || TPM2
depends on !VBOOT_RETURN_FROM_VERSTAGE
help
Enables measured boot (experimental)
config TPM_MEASURED_BOOT_RUNTIME_DATA
string "Runtime data whitelist"
default ""
depends on TPM_MEASURED_BOOT
help
Runtime data whitelist of cbfs filenames. Needs to be a
space delimited list
security/vboot: Decouple measured boot from verified boot Currently, those who want to use measured boot implemented within vboot should enable verified boot first, along with sections such as GBB and RW slots defined with manually written fmd files, even if they do not actually want to verify anything. As discussed in CB:34977, measured boot should be decoupled from verified boot and make them two fully independent options. Crypto routines necessary for measurement could be reused, and TPM and CRTM init should be done somewhere other than vboot_logic_executed() if verified boot is not enabled. In this revision, only TCPA log is initialized during bootblock. Before TPM gets set up, digests are not measured into tpm immediately, but cached in TCPA log, and measured into determined PCRs right after TPM is up. This change allows those who do not want to use the verified boot scheme implemented by vboot as well as its requirement of a more complex partition scheme designed for chromeos to make use of the measured boot functionality implemented within vboot library to measure the boot process. TODO: Measure MRC Cache somewhere, as MRC Cache has never resided in CBFS any more, so it cannot be covered by tspi_measure_cbfs_hook(). Change-Id: I1fb376b4a8b98baffaee4d574937797bba1f8aee Signed-off-by: Bill XIE <persmule@hardenedlinux.org> Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/35077 Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org> Reviewed-by: Philipp Deppenwiese <zaolin.daisuki@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Werner Zeh <werner.zeh@siemens.com>
2019-08-22 14:28:36 +02:00
endmenu # Trusted Platform Module (tpm)