2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
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/* Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
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*
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2017-02-10 03:06:16 +01:00
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
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* met:
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*
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* * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
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* copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
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* in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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* * Neither the name of Google Inc. nor the names of its
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* contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
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* this software without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
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* "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
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* LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
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* A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
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* OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
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* LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
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* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
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* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
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* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
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* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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/*
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2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
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* Functions for querying, manipulating and locking rollback indices
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* stored in the TPM NVRAM.
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*/
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2018-02-27 19:40:52 +01:00
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#include <security/vboot/antirollback.h>
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2019-07-23 10:26:30 +02:00
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#include <security/vboot/tpm_common.h>
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2014-12-04 02:35:53 +01:00
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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2018-02-27 19:40:52 +01:00
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#include <security/tpm/tspi.h>
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2014-12-04 02:35:53 +01:00
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#include <vb2_api.h>
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2016-06-06 21:12:34 +02:00
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#include <console/console.h>
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2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
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#ifdef FOR_TEST
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2014-07-16 04:47:32 +02:00
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#include <stdio.h>
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#define VBDEBUG(format, args...) printf(format, ## args)
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#else
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#define VBDEBUG(format, args...) \
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printk(BIOS_INFO, "%s():%d: " format, __func__, __LINE__, ## args)
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2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
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#endif
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2014-07-16 04:47:32 +02:00
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#define RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tpm_cmd) do { \
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2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
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uint32_t result_; \
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2014-07-16 04:47:32 +02:00
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if ((result_ = (tpm_cmd)) != TPM_SUCCESS) { \
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VBDEBUG("Antirollback: %08x returned by " #tpm_cmd \
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"\n", (int)result_); \
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2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
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return result_; \
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} \
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} while (0)
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2018-07-30 01:27:47 +02:00
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#define TPM_PCR_GBB_FLAGS_NAME "GBB flags"
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#define TPM_PCR_GBB_HWID_NAME "GBB HWID"
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2015-01-31 03:45:27 +01:00
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2016-06-06 21:12:34 +02:00
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static uint32_t safe_write(uint32_t index, const void *data, uint32_t length);
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2014-07-16 04:47:32 +02:00
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static uint32_t read_space_firmware(struct vb2_context *ctx)
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2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
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{
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int attempts = 3;
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while (attempts--) {
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2019-12-11 10:25:02 +01:00
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_read(FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX,
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ctx->secdata_firmware,
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VB2_SECDATA_FIRMWARE_SIZE));
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2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
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2019-12-11 10:25:02 +01:00
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if (vb2api_secdata_firmware_check(ctx) == VB2_SUCCESS)
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2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
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return TPM_SUCCESS;
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2014-07-16 04:47:32 +02:00
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VBDEBUG("TPM: %s() - bad CRC\n", __func__);
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2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
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}
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2014-07-16 04:47:32 +02:00
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VBDEBUG("TPM: %s() - too many bad CRCs, giving up\n", __func__);
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2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
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return TPM_E_CORRUPTED_STATE;
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}
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2016-11-08 08:47:11 +01:00
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static uint32_t read_space_rec_hash(uint8_t *data)
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{
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_read(REC_HASH_NV_INDEX, data,
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REC_HASH_NV_SIZE));
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return TPM_SUCCESS;
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}
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2014-09-29 22:02:29 +02:00
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static uint32_t write_secdata(uint32_t index,
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const uint8_t *secdata,
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uint32_t len)
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2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
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{
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2014-09-29 22:02:29 +02:00
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uint8_t sd[32];
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uint32_t rv;
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2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
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int attempts = 3;
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2014-09-29 22:02:29 +02:00
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if (len > sizeof(sd)) {
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VBDEBUG("TPM: %s() - data is too large\n", __func__);
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return TPM_E_WRITE_FAILURE;
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}
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2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
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while (attempts--) {
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2014-09-29 22:02:29 +02:00
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rv = safe_write(index, secdata, len);
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2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
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/* Can't write, not gonna try again */
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2014-09-29 22:02:29 +02:00
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if (rv != TPM_SUCCESS)
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return rv;
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2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
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/* Read it back to be sure it got the right values. */
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2014-09-29 22:02:29 +02:00
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rv = tlcl_read(index, sd, len);
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if (rv == TPM_SUCCESS && memcmp(secdata, sd, len) == 0)
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return rv;
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2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
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2014-09-29 22:02:29 +02:00
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VBDEBUG("TPM: %s() failed. trying again\n", __func__);
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2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
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/* Try writing it again. Maybe it was garbled on the way out. */
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}
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2014-07-16 04:47:32 +02:00
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VBDEBUG("TPM: %s() - too many failures, giving up\n", __func__);
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2014-09-29 22:02:29 +02:00
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2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
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return TPM_E_CORRUPTED_STATE;
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}
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2016-11-08 08:47:11 +01:00
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/*
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* This is used to initialize the TPM space for recovery hash after defining
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* it. Since there is no data available to calculate hash at the point where TPM
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* space is defined, initialize it to all 0s.
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*/
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static const uint8_t rec_hash_data[REC_HASH_NV_SIZE] = { };
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2019-03-06 01:53:33 +01:00
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#if CONFIG(TPM2)
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2018-02-27 19:40:52 +01:00
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/*
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* Different sets of NVRAM space attributes apply to the "ro" spaces,
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* i.e. those which should not be possible to delete or modify once
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* the RO exits, and the rest of the NVRAM spaces.
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*/
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2019-06-22 09:21:18 +02:00
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static const TPMA_NV ro_space_attributes = {
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2018-02-27 19:40:52 +01:00
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.TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1,
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.TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1,
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.TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1,
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.TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1,
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.TPMA_NV_WRITE_STCLEAR = 1,
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.TPMA_NV_POLICY_DELETE = 1,
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};
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2019-06-22 09:21:18 +02:00
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static const TPMA_NV rw_space_attributes = {
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2018-02-27 19:40:52 +01:00
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.TPMA_NV_PPWRITE = 1,
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.TPMA_NV_AUTHREAD = 1,
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.TPMA_NV_PPREAD = 1,
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.TPMA_NV_PLATFORMCREATE = 1,
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};
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/*
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* This policy digest was obtained using TPM2_PolicyPCR
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* selecting only PCR_0 with a value of all zeros.
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*/
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2019-06-22 09:21:18 +02:00
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static const uint8_t pcr0_unchanged_policy[] = {
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2018-02-27 19:40:52 +01:00
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0x09, 0x93, 0x3C, 0xCE, 0xEB, 0xB4, 0x41, 0x11, 0x18, 0x81, 0x1D,
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0xD4, 0x47, 0x78, 0x80, 0x08, 0x88, 0x86, 0x62, 0x2D, 0xD7, 0x79,
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0x94, 0x46, 0x62, 0x26, 0x68, 0x8E, 0xEE, 0xE6, 0x6A, 0xA1};
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2016-06-06 21:12:34 +02:00
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/* Nothing special in the TPM2 path yet. */
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static uint32_t safe_write(uint32_t index, const void *data, uint32_t length)
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2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
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{
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2016-06-06 21:12:34 +02:00
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return tlcl_write(index, data, length);
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}
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2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
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security/vboot: overwrite existing spaces during factory init for tpm2
In TPM 2.0 case, if the factory initialization is interrupted after
defining, say, the kernel tpm nvram space but before writing to this
space, the following will happen upon reboot when the factory
initialization will be re-attempted. Writing to this space will be
skipped, and coreboot will finish the factory initialization with
this space remained unwritten. At a later stage, when the rollback
logic will attempt to check the version in the kernel space, it will
fail (TPM2.0 returns an error when reading from unwritten spaces),
and the system will go into recovery with no way out (since the
kernel space will never be written).
This change fixes that by always writing to the kernel, MRC hash and
firmware spaces during factory initialization, even if the space
already existed by that time.
BUG=b:71884828
TEST=delete, define, but not write to the kernel space; trigger
factory initialization; coreboot should fill the kernel
space and continue booting.
Change-Id: I48d8bb4f9fc0e5276e6ec81247b3b6768ec9fa3b
Signed-off-by: Andrey Pronin <apronin@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/23456
Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org>
2018-01-26 21:47:51 +01:00
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static uint32_t set_space(const char *name, uint32_t index, const void *data,
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2018-02-27 19:40:52 +01:00
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uint32_t length, const TPMA_NV nv_attributes,
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const uint8_t *nv_policy, size_t nv_policy_size)
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2016-06-06 21:12:34 +02:00
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{
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2016-11-15 01:36:26 +01:00
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uint32_t rv;
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2018-02-27 19:40:52 +01:00
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rv = tlcl_define_space(index, length, nv_attributes, nv_policy,
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nv_policy_size);
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2016-11-15 01:36:26 +01:00
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if (rv == TPM_E_NV_DEFINED) {
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security/vboot: overwrite existing spaces during factory init for tpm2
In TPM 2.0 case, if the factory initialization is interrupted after
defining, say, the kernel tpm nvram space but before writing to this
space, the following will happen upon reboot when the factory
initialization will be re-attempted. Writing to this space will be
skipped, and coreboot will finish the factory initialization with
this space remained unwritten. At a later stage, when the rollback
logic will attempt to check the version in the kernel space, it will
fail (TPM2.0 returns an error when reading from unwritten spaces),
and the system will go into recovery with no way out (since the
kernel space will never be written).
This change fixes that by always writing to the kernel, MRC hash and
firmware spaces during factory initialization, even if the space
already existed by that time.
BUG=b:71884828
TEST=delete, define, but not write to the kernel space; trigger
factory initialization; coreboot should fill the kernel
space and continue booting.
Change-Id: I48d8bb4f9fc0e5276e6ec81247b3b6768ec9fa3b
Signed-off-by: Andrey Pronin <apronin@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/23456
Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org>
2018-01-26 21:47:51 +01:00
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/*
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* Continue with writing: it may be defined, but not written
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* to. In that case a subsequent tlcl_read() would still return
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* TPM_E_BADINDEX on TPM 2.0. The cases when some non-firmware
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* space is defined while the firmware space is not there
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* should be rare (interrupted initialization), so no big harm
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* in writing once again even if it was written already.
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*/
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VBDEBUG("%s: %s space already exists\n", __func__, name);
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rv = TPM_SUCCESS;
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2016-11-15 01:36:26 +01:00
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}
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if (rv != TPM_SUCCESS)
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return rv;
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2019-12-04 21:50:43 +01:00
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return write_secdata(index, data, length);
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2016-06-06 21:12:34 +02:00
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}
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|
security/vboot: overwrite existing spaces during factory init for tpm2
In TPM 2.0 case, if the factory initialization is interrupted after
defining, say, the kernel tpm nvram space but before writing to this
space, the following will happen upon reboot when the factory
initialization will be re-attempted. Writing to this space will be
skipped, and coreboot will finish the factory initialization with
this space remained unwritten. At a later stage, when the rollback
logic will attempt to check the version in the kernel space, it will
fail (TPM2.0 returns an error when reading from unwritten spaces),
and the system will go into recovery with no way out (since the
kernel space will never be written).
This change fixes that by always writing to the kernel, MRC hash and
firmware spaces during factory initialization, even if the space
already existed by that time.
BUG=b:71884828
TEST=delete, define, but not write to the kernel space; trigger
factory initialization; coreboot should fill the kernel
space and continue booting.
Change-Id: I48d8bb4f9fc0e5276e6ec81247b3b6768ec9fa3b
Signed-off-by: Andrey Pronin <apronin@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/23456
Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org>
2018-01-26 21:47:51 +01:00
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static uint32_t set_firmware_space(const void *firmware_blob)
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2016-11-08 08:47:11 +01:00
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{
|
security/vboot: overwrite existing spaces during factory init for tpm2
In TPM 2.0 case, if the factory initialization is interrupted after
defining, say, the kernel tpm nvram space but before writing to this
space, the following will happen upon reboot when the factory
initialization will be re-attempted. Writing to this space will be
skipped, and coreboot will finish the factory initialization with
this space remained unwritten. At a later stage, when the rollback
logic will attempt to check the version in the kernel space, it will
fail (TPM2.0 returns an error when reading from unwritten spaces),
and the system will go into recovery with no way out (since the
kernel space will never be written).
This change fixes that by always writing to the kernel, MRC hash and
firmware spaces during factory initialization, even if the space
already existed by that time.
BUG=b:71884828
TEST=delete, define, but not write to the kernel space; trigger
factory initialization; coreboot should fill the kernel
space and continue booting.
Change-Id: I48d8bb4f9fc0e5276e6ec81247b3b6768ec9fa3b
Signed-off-by: Andrey Pronin <apronin@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/23456
Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org>
2018-01-26 21:47:51 +01:00
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return set_space("firmware", FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX, firmware_blob,
|
2019-12-11 10:25:02 +01:00
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VB2_SECDATA_FIRMWARE_SIZE, ro_space_attributes,
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2018-02-27 19:40:52 +01:00
|
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pcr0_unchanged_policy, sizeof(pcr0_unchanged_policy));
|
security/vboot: overwrite existing spaces during factory init for tpm2
In TPM 2.0 case, if the factory initialization is interrupted after
defining, say, the kernel tpm nvram space but before writing to this
space, the following will happen upon reboot when the factory
initialization will be re-attempted. Writing to this space will be
skipped, and coreboot will finish the factory initialization with
this space remained unwritten. At a later stage, when the rollback
logic will attempt to check the version in the kernel space, it will
fail (TPM2.0 returns an error when reading from unwritten spaces),
and the system will go into recovery with no way out (since the
kernel space will never be written).
This change fixes that by always writing to the kernel, MRC hash and
firmware spaces during factory initialization, even if the space
already existed by that time.
BUG=b:71884828
TEST=delete, define, but not write to the kernel space; trigger
factory initialization; coreboot should fill the kernel
space and continue booting.
Change-Id: I48d8bb4f9fc0e5276e6ec81247b3b6768ec9fa3b
Signed-off-by: Andrey Pronin <apronin@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/23456
Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org>
2018-01-26 21:47:51 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-11-15 01:36:26 +01:00
|
|
|
|
security/vboot: overwrite existing spaces during factory init for tpm2
In TPM 2.0 case, if the factory initialization is interrupted after
defining, say, the kernel tpm nvram space but before writing to this
space, the following will happen upon reboot when the factory
initialization will be re-attempted. Writing to this space will be
skipped, and coreboot will finish the factory initialization with
this space remained unwritten. At a later stage, when the rollback
logic will attempt to check the version in the kernel space, it will
fail (TPM2.0 returns an error when reading from unwritten spaces),
and the system will go into recovery with no way out (since the
kernel space will never be written).
This change fixes that by always writing to the kernel, MRC hash and
firmware spaces during factory initialization, even if the space
already existed by that time.
BUG=b:71884828
TEST=delete, define, but not write to the kernel space; trigger
factory initialization; coreboot should fill the kernel
space and continue booting.
Change-Id: I48d8bb4f9fc0e5276e6ec81247b3b6768ec9fa3b
Signed-off-by: Andrey Pronin <apronin@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/23456
Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org>
2018-01-26 21:47:51 +01:00
|
|
|
static uint32_t set_kernel_space(const void *kernel_blob)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return set_space("kernel", KERNEL_NV_INDEX, kernel_blob,
|
2019-12-11 10:25:02 +01:00
|
|
|
VB2_SECDATA_KERNEL_SIZE, rw_space_attributes, NULL, 0);
|
security/vboot: overwrite existing spaces during factory init for tpm2
In TPM 2.0 case, if the factory initialization is interrupted after
defining, say, the kernel tpm nvram space but before writing to this
space, the following will happen upon reboot when the factory
initialization will be re-attempted. Writing to this space will be
skipped, and coreboot will finish the factory initialization with
this space remained unwritten. At a later stage, when the rollback
logic will attempt to check the version in the kernel space, it will
fail (TPM2.0 returns an error when reading from unwritten spaces),
and the system will go into recovery with no way out (since the
kernel space will never be written).
This change fixes that by always writing to the kernel, MRC hash and
firmware spaces during factory initialization, even if the space
already existed by that time.
BUG=b:71884828
TEST=delete, define, but not write to the kernel space; trigger
factory initialization; coreboot should fill the kernel
space and continue booting.
Change-Id: I48d8bb4f9fc0e5276e6ec81247b3b6768ec9fa3b
Signed-off-by: Andrey Pronin <apronin@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/23456
Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org>
2018-01-26 21:47:51 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-11-15 01:36:26 +01:00
|
|
|
|
security/vboot: overwrite existing spaces during factory init for tpm2
In TPM 2.0 case, if the factory initialization is interrupted after
defining, say, the kernel tpm nvram space but before writing to this
space, the following will happen upon reboot when the factory
initialization will be re-attempted. Writing to this space will be
skipped, and coreboot will finish the factory initialization with
this space remained unwritten. At a later stage, when the rollback
logic will attempt to check the version in the kernel space, it will
fail (TPM2.0 returns an error when reading from unwritten spaces),
and the system will go into recovery with no way out (since the
kernel space will never be written).
This change fixes that by always writing to the kernel, MRC hash and
firmware spaces during factory initialization, even if the space
already existed by that time.
BUG=b:71884828
TEST=delete, define, but not write to the kernel space; trigger
factory initialization; coreboot should fill the kernel
space and continue booting.
Change-Id: I48d8bb4f9fc0e5276e6ec81247b3b6768ec9fa3b
Signed-off-by: Andrey Pronin <apronin@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://review.coreboot.org/23456
Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
Tested-by: build bot (Jenkins) <no-reply@coreboot.org>
Reviewed-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org>
2018-01-26 21:47:51 +01:00
|
|
|
static uint32_t set_rec_hash_space(const uint8_t *data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return set_space("MRC Hash", REC_HASH_NV_INDEX, data,
|
2018-02-27 19:40:52 +01:00
|
|
|
REC_HASH_NV_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
ro_space_attributes, pcr0_unchanged_policy,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(pcr0_unchanged_policy));
|
2016-11-08 08:47:11 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-06 21:12:34 +02:00
|
|
|
static uint32_t _factory_initialize_tpm(struct vb2_context *ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2016-07-04 00:56:41 +02:00
|
|
|
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_force_clear());
|
2016-11-15 01:36:26 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Of all NVRAM spaces defined by this function the firmware space
|
|
|
|
* must be defined last, because its existence is considered an
|
|
|
|
* indication that TPM factory initialization was successfully
|
|
|
|
* completed.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-12-11 10:25:02 +01:00
|
|
|
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(set_kernel_space(ctx->secdata_kernel));
|
2016-11-08 08:47:11 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2019-03-06 01:53:33 +01:00
|
|
|
if (CONFIG(VBOOT_HAS_REC_HASH_SPACE))
|
2016-11-08 08:47:11 +01:00
|
|
|
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(set_rec_hash_space(rec_hash_data));
|
|
|
|
|
2019-12-11 10:25:02 +01:00
|
|
|
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(set_firmware_space(ctx->secdata_firmware));
|
2016-11-15 01:36:26 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-06-06 21:12:34 +02:00
|
|
|
return TPM_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-04 02:08:10 +02:00
|
|
|
uint32_t antirollback_lock_space_firmware(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return tlcl_lock_nv_write(FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-11-08 08:47:11 +01:00
|
|
|
uint32_t antirollback_lock_space_rec_hash(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return tlcl_lock_nv_write(REC_HASH_NV_INDEX);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-06 21:12:34 +02:00
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Like tlcl_write(), but checks for write errors due to hitting the 64-write
|
|
|
|
* limit and clears the TPM when that happens. This can only happen when the
|
|
|
|
* TPM is unowned, so it is OK to clear it (and we really have no choice).
|
|
|
|
* This is not expected to happen frequently, but it could happen.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static uint32_t safe_write(uint32_t index, const void *data, uint32_t length)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint32_t result = tlcl_write(index, data, length);
|
|
|
|
if (result == TPM_E_MAXNVWRITES) {
|
|
|
|
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tpm_clear_and_reenable());
|
|
|
|
return tlcl_write(index, data, length);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
|
|
|
return result;
|
2016-06-06 21:12:34 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Similarly to safe_write(), this ensures we don't fail a DefineSpace because
|
|
|
|
* we hit the TPM write limit. This is even less likely to happen than with
|
|
|
|
* writes because we only define spaces once at initialization, but we'd
|
|
|
|
* rather be paranoid about this.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static uint32_t safe_define_space(uint32_t index, uint32_t perm, uint32_t size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint32_t result = tlcl_define_space(index, perm, size);
|
|
|
|
if (result == TPM_E_MAXNVWRITES) {
|
|
|
|
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tpm_clear_and_reenable());
|
|
|
|
return tlcl_define_space(index, perm, size);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-11-08 08:47:11 +01:00
|
|
|
static uint32_t set_rec_hash_space(const uint8_t *data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(safe_define_space(REC_HASH_NV_INDEX,
|
|
|
|
TPM_NV_PER_GLOBALLOCK |
|
|
|
|
TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE,
|
|
|
|
REC_HASH_NV_SIZE));
|
|
|
|
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(write_secdata(REC_HASH_NV_INDEX, data,
|
|
|
|
REC_HASH_NV_SIZE));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return TPM_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-06 21:12:34 +02:00
|
|
|
static uint32_t _factory_initialize_tpm(struct vb2_context *ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
TPM_PERMANENT_FLAGS pflags;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t result;
|
2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-16 04:47:32 +02:00
|
|
|
result = tlcl_get_permanent_flags(&pflags);
|
2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
|
|
|
if (result != TPM_SUCCESS)
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* TPM may come from the factory without physical presence finalized.
|
|
|
|
* Fix if necessary.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-07-16 04:47:32 +02:00
|
|
|
VBDEBUG("TPM: physicalPresenceLifetimeLock=%d\n",
|
|
|
|
pflags.physicalPresenceLifetimeLock);
|
2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!pflags.physicalPresenceLifetimeLock) {
|
2014-07-16 04:47:32 +02:00
|
|
|
VBDEBUG("TPM: Finalizing physical presence\n");
|
|
|
|
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_finalize_physical_presence());
|
2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The TPM will not enforce the NV authorization restrictions until the
|
|
|
|
* execution of a TPM_NV_DefineSpace with the handle of
|
|
|
|
* TPM_NV_INDEX_LOCK. Here we create that space if it doesn't already
|
|
|
|
* exist. */
|
2014-07-16 04:47:32 +02:00
|
|
|
VBDEBUG("TPM: nvLocked=%d\n", pflags.nvLocked);
|
2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!pflags.nvLocked) {
|
2014-07-16 04:47:32 +02:00
|
|
|
VBDEBUG("TPM: Enabling NV locking\n");
|
|
|
|
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tlcl_set_nv_locked());
|
2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Clear TPM owner, in case the TPM is already owned for some reason. */
|
2014-07-16 04:47:32 +02:00
|
|
|
VBDEBUG("TPM: Clearing owner\n");
|
|
|
|
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tpm_clear_and_reenable());
|
2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2019-12-11 10:25:02 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Define and write secdata_kernel space. */
|
2014-09-29 22:02:29 +02:00
|
|
|
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(safe_define_space(KERNEL_NV_INDEX,
|
|
|
|
TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE,
|
2019-12-11 10:25:02 +01:00
|
|
|
VB2_SECDATA_KERNEL_SIZE));
|
2014-09-29 22:02:29 +02:00
|
|
|
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(write_secdata(KERNEL_NV_INDEX,
|
2019-12-11 10:25:02 +01:00
|
|
|
ctx->secdata_kernel,
|
|
|
|
VB2_SECDATA_KERNEL_SIZE));
|
2014-09-29 22:02:29 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2019-12-11 10:25:02 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Define and write secdata_firmware space. */
|
2014-07-16 04:47:32 +02:00
|
|
|
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(safe_define_space(FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX,
|
2019-12-11 10:25:02 +01:00
|
|
|
TPM_NV_PER_GLOBALLOCK |
|
|
|
|
TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE,
|
|
|
|
VB2_SECDATA_FIRMWARE_SIZE));
|
2014-09-29 22:02:29 +02:00
|
|
|
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(write_secdata(FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX,
|
2019-12-11 10:25:02 +01:00
|
|
|
ctx->secdata_firmware,
|
|
|
|
VB2_SECDATA_FIRMWARE_SIZE));
|
2016-11-08 08:47:11 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Define and set rec hash space, if available. */
|
2019-03-06 01:53:33 +01:00
|
|
|
if (CONFIG(VBOOT_HAS_REC_HASH_SPACE))
|
2016-11-08 08:47:11 +01:00
|
|
|
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(set_rec_hash_space(rec_hash_data));
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-06 21:12:34 +02:00
|
|
|
return TPM_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-07-04 02:08:10 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uint32_t antirollback_lock_space_firmware(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return tlcl_set_global_lock();
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-11-08 08:47:11 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uint32_t antirollback_lock_space_rec_hash(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Nothing needs to be done here, since global lock is already set while
|
|
|
|
* locking firmware space.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return TPM_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-06-06 21:12:34 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2016-11-11 18:33:43 +01:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* Perform one-time initializations.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Create the NVRAM spaces, and set their initial values as needed. Sets the
|
|
|
|
* nvLocked bit and ensures the physical presence command is enabled and
|
|
|
|
* locked.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static uint32_t factory_initialize_tpm(struct vb2_context *ctx)
|
2016-06-06 21:12:34 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint32_t result;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-12-11 10:25:02 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Set initial values of secdata_firmware and secdata_kernel spaces. */
|
|
|
|
vb2api_secdata_firmware_create(ctx);
|
|
|
|
vb2api_secdata_kernel_create(ctx);
|
2016-06-06 21:12:34 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
VBDEBUG("TPM: factory initialization\n");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Do a full test. This only happens the first time the device is
|
|
|
|
* turned on in the factory, so performance is not an issue. This is
|
|
|
|
* almost certainly not necessary, but it gives us more confidence
|
|
|
|
* about some code paths below that are difficult to
|
|
|
|
* test---specifically the ones that set lifetime flags, and are only
|
|
|
|
* executed once per physical TPM.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
result = tlcl_self_test_full();
|
|
|
|
if (result != TPM_SUCCESS)
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
result = _factory_initialize_tpm(ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (result != TPM_SUCCESS)
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
2014-09-29 22:02:29 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2019-12-04 21:50:43 +01:00
|
|
|
/* _factory_initialize_tpm() writes initial secdata values to TPM
|
|
|
|
immediately, so let vboot know that it's up to date now. */
|
|
|
|
ctx->flags &= ~(VB2_CONTEXT_SECDATA_FIRMWARE_CHANGED |
|
|
|
|
VB2_CONTEXT_SECDATA_KERNEL_CHANGED);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-09-29 22:02:29 +02:00
|
|
|
VBDEBUG("TPM: factory initialization successful\n");
|
2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return TPM_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-16 04:47:32 +02:00
|
|
|
uint32_t antirollback_read_space_firmware(struct vb2_context *ctx)
|
2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-07-16 04:47:32 +02:00
|
|
|
uint32_t rv;
|
2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-16 04:47:32 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Read the firmware space. */
|
|
|
|
rv = read_space_firmware(ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (rv == TPM_E_BADINDEX) {
|
2019-12-04 21:50:43 +01:00
|
|
|
/* This seems the first time we've run. Initialize the TPM. */
|
2014-07-16 04:47:32 +02:00
|
|
|
VBDEBUG("TPM: Not initialized yet.\n");
|
|
|
|
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(factory_initialize_tpm(ctx));
|
|
|
|
} else if (rv != TPM_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
VBDEBUG("TPM: Firmware space in a bad state; giving up.\n");
|
2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
|
|
|
return TPM_E_CORRUPTED_STATE;
|
2014-07-16 04:47:32 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return TPM_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-16 04:47:32 +02:00
|
|
|
uint32_t antirollback_write_space_firmware(struct vb2_context *ctx)
|
2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-03-06 01:53:33 +01:00
|
|
|
if (CONFIG(CR50_IMMEDIATELY_COMMIT_FW_SECDATA))
|
2017-03-08 18:23:11 +01:00
|
|
|
tlcl_cr50_enable_nvcommits();
|
2019-12-11 10:25:02 +01:00
|
|
|
return write_secdata(FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX, ctx->secdata_firmware,
|
|
|
|
VB2_SECDATA_FIRMWARE_SIZE);
|
2014-07-02 17:37:23 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-11-08 08:47:11 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uint32_t antirollback_read_space_rec_hash(uint8_t *data, uint32_t size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (size != REC_HASH_NV_SIZE) {
|
|
|
|
VBDEBUG("TPM: Incorrect buffer size for rec hash. "
|
|
|
|
"(Expected=0x%x Actual=0x%x).\n", REC_HASH_NV_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
size);
|
|
|
|
return TPM_E_READ_FAILURE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return read_space_rec_hash(data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uint32_t antirollback_write_space_rec_hash(const uint8_t *data, uint32_t size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint8_t spc_data[REC_HASH_NV_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
uint32_t rv;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (size != REC_HASH_NV_SIZE) {
|
|
|
|
VBDEBUG("TPM: Incorrect buffer size for rec hash. "
|
|
|
|
"(Expected=0x%x Actual=0x%x).\n", REC_HASH_NV_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
size);
|
|
|
|
return TPM_E_WRITE_FAILURE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rv = read_space_rec_hash(spc_data);
|
|
|
|
if (rv == TPM_E_BADINDEX) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If space is not defined already for recovery hash, define
|
|
|
|
* new space.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
VBDEBUG("TPM: Initializing recovery hash space.\n");
|
|
|
|
return set_rec_hash_space(data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (rv != TPM_SUCCESS)
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return write_secdata(REC_HASH_NV_INDEX, data, size);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-02-27 19:40:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2019-07-31 08:19:00 +02:00
|
|
|
vb2_error_t vb2ex_tpm_clear_owner(struct vb2_context *ctx)
|
2018-02-27 19:40:52 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint32_t rv;
|
|
|
|
printk(BIOS_INFO, "Clearing TPM owner\n");
|
|
|
|
rv = tpm_clear_and_reenable();
|
|
|
|
if (rv)
|
|
|
|
return VB2_ERROR_EX_TPM_CLEAR_OWNER;
|
|
|
|
return VB2_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
}
|