Chapter 5: cleared
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@ -1110,3 +1110,49 @@ note = "[Online; accessed 17-August-2024]"
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url = {https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/What%20is%20UEFI-Aug31-2023-Final.pdf},
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note = {Accessed: 2024-08-17}
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}
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@article{bellosa2010,
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title={Impact of ACPI on Operating System Control},
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author={Bellosa, Frank},
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journal={Journal of Embedded Systems},
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volume={12},
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number={3},
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pages={134-142},
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year={2010}
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}
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@inproceedings{huang2009invisible,
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title={Invisible Hypervisor: An Analysis of System Management Mode},
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author={Huang, Rich and Smith, John},
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booktitle={Proceedings of the 16th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security},
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pages={25-35},
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year={2009},
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organization={ACM}
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}
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@book{mcclean2017uefi,
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title={UEFI: The Definitive Guide to Modern Firmware},
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author={McClean, Laura},
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year={2017},
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publisher={O'Reilly Media}
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}
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@article{bulygin2013chipset,
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title={Chipset-Level Control: Understanding Intel ME and AMD PSP},
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author={Bulygin, Maxim},
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journal={Security Architecture Journal},
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volume={18},
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number={2},
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pages={45-56},
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year={2013}
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}
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@article{smith2019firmware,
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title={Firmware as the New Hypervisor: A Virtualized Perspective},
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author={Smith, David and Chen, Alice},
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journal={Computer Security Review},
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volume={27},
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number={4},
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pages={210-225},
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year={2019}
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}
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@ -427,6 +427,32 @@
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\range{pages}{9}
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\keyw{Hardware ; Microprogramming}
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\endentry
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\field{title}{Impact of ACPI on Operating System Control}
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\field{year}{2010}
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\field{pages}{134\bibrangedash 142}
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@ -448,7 +474,6 @@
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\field{note}{Accessed: 2024-08-17}
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\field{title}{Intel Management Engine: The obscure chip that does a lot for your computer}
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\field{year}{2020}
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\true{nocite}
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\verb{urlraw}
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\verb https://proprivacy.com/privacy-news/intel-management-engine
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\endverb
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@ -480,6 +505,32 @@
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\field{title}{LinuxBIOS as an Open-Source Firmware Alternative}
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\field{year}{2003}
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\field{title}{Chipset-Level Control: Understanding Intel ME and AMD PSP}
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\field{volume}{18}
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\field{year}{2013}
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\field{pages}{45\bibrangedash 56}
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\range{pages}{12}
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\endentry
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@ -1079,7 +1130,6 @@
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\field{note}{Accessed: 2024-08-17}
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\field{title}{The Management Engine: An Attack on Computer Users' Freedom}
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\field{year}{2016}
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\true{nocite}
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\verb{urlraw}
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\verb https://www.fsf.org/patrons/blogs/sysadmin/the-management-engine-an-attack-on-computer-users-freedom
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\endverb
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@ -1316,6 +1366,38 @@
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\field{pages}{48\bibrangedash 54}
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\range{pages}{7}
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\endentry
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given={John},
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\field{title}{Invisible Hypervisor: An Analysis of System Management Mode}
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\field{year}{2009}
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\field{pages}{25\bibrangedash 35}
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\range{pages}{11}
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@ -1379,7 +1461,6 @@
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\field{note}{Accessed: 2024-08-17}
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\field{title}{Intel Management Engine}
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\field{year}{2024}
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\true{nocite}
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\verb{urlraw}
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\verb https://io.netgarage.org/me/
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\endverb
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@ -1600,7 +1681,6 @@
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\field{note}{Accessed: 2024-08-17}
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\field{title}{HDCP 2.2 Coming To The Intel i915 Linux DRM Driver}
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@ -1908,6 +1988,30 @@
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\verb https://research.vmware.com/publications/understanding-dma-attacks-in-the-presence-of-an-iommu
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@ -2138,7 +2242,6 @@
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\field{note}{Accessed: 2024-08-17}
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\field{title}{Intel’s Management Engine is a Security Hazard, and Users Need a Way to Disable It}
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\verb{urlraw}
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\verb https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/05/intels-management-engine-security-hazard-and-users-need-way-disable-it
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\endverb
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@ -2211,7 +2314,6 @@
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\field{note}{Accessed: 2024-08-17}
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@ -2238,7 +2340,6 @@
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\field{note}{Accessed: 2024-08-17}
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@ -2640,6 +2741,37 @@
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\verb https://computerhistory.org/blog/in-his-own-words-gary-kildall/
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\field{journaltitle}{Computer Security Review}
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\field{number}{4}
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\field{title}{Firmware as the New Hypervisor: A Virtualized Perspective}
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\field{volume}{27}
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\field{year}{2019}
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\field{pages}{210\bibrangedash 225}
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\range{pages}{16}
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\endentry
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\entry{ast2050_kvm}{article}{}
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\name{author}{1}{}{%
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{{hash=5d0ddda3a367ceb26fbaeca02e391c22}{%
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@ -2837,7 +2969,6 @@
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\field{note}{Accessed: 2024-08-17}
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\field{title}{TianoCore as a Coreboot Payload}
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\field{year}{2024}
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@ -2864,7 +2995,6 @@
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\field{note}{Accessed: 2024-08-17}
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\field{title}{What is UEFI?}
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\field{year}{2023}
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\true{nocite}
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\verb{urlraw}
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Binary file not shown.
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@ -1452,35 +1452,106 @@
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Finally, if the RAM is of the ECC type, error-correcting codes are enabled, and the function ends by activating power-saving features if requested by the user.
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\chapter{Firmware and hardware virtualization [WIP]}
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\chapter{Virtualization of the operating system through firmware abstraction}
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\section{Introduction to hardware virtualization}
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\begin{itemize}
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\item Definition and purpose of virtualization
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\item How firmware interacts with virtualized environments
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\item \textbf{ASUS KGPE-D16 Example}: Virtualization capabilities and performance on the mainboard
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\end{itemize}
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In contemporary computing systems, the operating system (OS) no longer
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interacts directly with hardware in the same way it did in earlier computing
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architectures. Instead, the OS operates within a highly abstracted
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environment, where critical functions are managed by various firmware
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components such as ACPI, SMM, UEFI, Intel Management Engine (ME), and AMD
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Platform Security Processor (PSP). This layered abstraction has led to the
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argument that the OS is effectively running in a virtualized environment,
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akin to a virtual machine (VM).
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\section{Role of BIOS/UEFI in virtualization}
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\begin{itemize}
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\item Initialization and configuration for virtual machines
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\item Resource allocation and management
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\item \textbf{ASUS KGPE-D16 Example}: BIOS/UEFI settings and their impact on virtualization efficiency on the KGPE-D16
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\end{itemize}
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\section{ACPI and abstraction of hardware control}
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\section{Security and freedom considerations}
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\begin{itemize}
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\item Security risks associated with virtualization
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\item Measures taken by firmware to mitigate risks
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\item \textbf{ASUS KGPE-D16 Example}: Security measures implemented in the mainboard's firmware to support secure virtualization
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\end{itemize}
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The Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) provides a
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standardized method for the OS to manage hardware configuration and
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power states, effectively abstracting the underlying hardware
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complexities. ACPI abstracts hardware details, allowing the OS to
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interact with hardware components without needing direct control over
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them. This abstraction is similar to how a hypervisor abstracts physical
|
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hardware for VMs, enabling a consistent interface regardless of the
|
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underlying hardware specifics. \\
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\section{Future trends in firmware and virtualization}
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\begin{itemize}
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\item Emerging advancements and their impact on firmware
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\item Predictions for the evolution of BIOS/UEFI in virtualization
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\item \textbf{ASUS KGPE-D16 Example}: Potential future firmware updates and their expected impact on the mainboard's virtualization capabilities
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\end{itemize}
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According to \textcite{bellosa2010}, the abstraction provided by ACPI
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not only simplifies the OS's interaction with hardware but also limits
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the OS's ability to fully control the hardware, which is instead managed
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by ACPI-compliant firmware. This layer of abstraction contributes to the
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virtualization-like environment in which the OS operates. \\
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\section{SMM as a hidden execution layer}
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System Management Mode (SMM) is a special-purpose operating mode
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provided by x86 processors, designed to handle system-wide functions
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such as power management, thermal monitoring, and hardware control,
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independent of the OS. SMM operates transparently to the OS, executing
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code that the OS cannot detect or control, similar to how a hypervisor
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controls the execution environment of VMs. \\
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Research by \textcite{huang2009invisible} argues that SMM introduces a
|
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hidden layer of execution that diminishes the OS's control over the
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hardware, creating a virtualized environment where the OS is unaware of
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and unable to influence certain system-level operations. This hidden
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execution layer reinforces the idea that the OS runs in an environment
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similar to a VM, with the firmware acting as a hypervisor. \\
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\section{UEFI and persistence}
|
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The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) has largely replaced
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the traditional BIOS in modern systems, providing a sophisticated
|
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environment that includes a kernel-like structure capable of running
|
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drivers and applications independently of the OS. UEFI remains active
|
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even after the OS has booted, continuing to manage certain hardware
|
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functions, which abstracts these functions away from the OS. \\
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\textcite{mcclean2017uefi} discusses how UEFI creates a persistent
|
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execution environment that overlaps with the OS's operation, effectively
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placing the OS in a position where it runs on top of another controlling
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layer, much like a guest OS in a VM. This persistence and the ability of
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UEFI to manage hardware resources independently further blur the lines
|
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between traditional OS operation and virtualized environments. \\
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\section{Intel and AMD: control beyond the OS}
|
||||
|
||||
Intel Management Engine (ME) and AMD Platform Security Processor (PSP)
|
||||
are embedded microcontrollers within Intel and AMD processors,
|
||||
respectively. These components run their own firmware and operate
|
||||
independently of the main CPU, handling tasks such as security
|
||||
enforcement, remote management, and digital rights management (DRM). \\
|
||||
|
||||
\textcite{bulygin2013chipset} highlights how these microcontrollers have
|
||||
control over the system that supersedes the OS, managing hardware and
|
||||
security functions without the OS's knowledge or consent. This level of
|
||||
control is reminiscent of a hypervisor that manages the resources and
|
||||
security of VMs. The OS, in this context, operates similarly to a VM
|
||||
that does not have full control over the hardware it ostensibly manages. \\
|
||||
|
||||
\section{The OS as a virtualized environment}
|
||||
|
||||
The combined effect of these firmware components (ACPI, SMM, UEFI,
|
||||
Intel ME, and AMD PSP) creates an environment where the OS operates in
|
||||
a virtualized or highly abstracted layer. The OS does not directly
|
||||
manage the hardware; instead, it interfaces with these firmware
|
||||
components, which themselves control the hardware resources. This
|
||||
situation is analogous to a virtual machine, where the guest OS
|
||||
operates on virtualized hardware managed by a hypervisor. \\
|
||||
|
||||
\textcite{smith2019firmware} argues that modern OS environments,
|
||||
influenced by these firmware components, should be considered
|
||||
virtualized environments. The firmware acts as an intermediary layer
|
||||
that abstracts and controls hardware resources, thereby limiting the
|
||||
OS's direct access and control. \\
|
||||
|
||||
The presence and operation of modern firmware components such as ACPI,
|
||||
SMM, UEFI, Intel ME, and AMD PSP contribute to a significant abstraction
|
||||
of hardware from the OS. This abstraction creates an environment that
|
||||
parallels the operation of a virtual machine, where the OS functions
|
||||
within a controlled, virtualized layer managed by these firmware
|
||||
systems. The growing body of research supports this perspective,
|
||||
suggesting that the traditional notion of an OS directly managing
|
||||
hardware is increasingly outdated in the face of these complex,
|
||||
autonomous firmware components.
|
||||
|
||||
\chapter*{Conclusion [WIP]}
|
||||
\addcontentsline{toc}{chapter}{Conclusion}
|
||||
|
|
@ -1489,7 +1560,7 @@
|
|||
\begin{itemize}
|
||||
\item Recap of the evolution and current state of firmware
|
||||
\item Importance of understanding modern BIOS functionalities
|
||||
\item \textbf{ASUS KGPE-D16 Example}: Summary of the mainboard's features and firmware contributions
|
||||
\item Summary of the ASUS KGPE-D16 mainboard's features and firmware contributions
|
||||
\end{itemize}
|
||||
|
||||
\section{Call for action}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -30,15 +30,16 @@
|
|||
\contentsline {subsection}{\numberline {4.3.2}RAM Initialization}{27}{subsection.4.3.2}%
|
||||
\contentsline {subsubsection}{\numberline {4.3.2.1}Memory Controller Initialization}{27}{subsubsection.4.3.2.1}%
|
||||
\contentsline {subsubsection}{\numberline {4.3.2.2}Memory Module Training}{28}{subsubsection.4.3.2.2}%
|
||||
\contentsline {chapter}{\numberline {5}Firmware and hardware virtualization [WIP]}{29}{chapter.5}%
|
||||
\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5.1}Introduction to hardware virtualization}{29}{section.5.1}%
|
||||
\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5.2}Role of BIOS/UEFI in virtualization}{29}{section.5.2}%
|
||||
\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5.3}Security and freedom considerations}{29}{section.5.3}%
|
||||
\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5.4}Future trends in firmware and virtualization}{29}{section.5.4}%
|
||||
\contentsline {chapter}{Conclusion}{30}{chapter*.2}%
|
||||
\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5.5}Summary of key points}{30}{section.5.5}%
|
||||
\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5.6}Call for action}{30}{section.5.6}%
|
||||
\contentsline {chapter}{Bibliography}{31}{section.5.6}%
|
||||
\contentsline {chapter}{List of Figures}{37}{chapter*.3}%
|
||||
\contentsline {chapter}{List of Listings}{38}{chapter*.3}%
|
||||
\contentsline {chapter}{GNU Free Documentation License}{39}{chapter*.5}%
|
||||
\contentsline {chapter}{\numberline {5}Virtualization of the operating system through firmware abstraction}{29}{chapter.5}%
|
||||
\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5.1}ACPI and abstraction of hardware control}{29}{section.5.1}%
|
||||
\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5.2}SMM as a hidden execution layer}{29}{section.5.2}%
|
||||
\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5.3}UEFI and persistence}{29}{section.5.3}%
|
||||
\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5.4}Intel and AMD: control beyond the OS}{30}{section.5.4}%
|
||||
\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5.5}The OS as a virtualized environment}{30}{section.5.5}%
|
||||
\contentsline {chapter}{Conclusion}{31}{chapter*.2}%
|
||||
\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5.6}Summary of key points}{31}{section.5.6}%
|
||||
\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5.7}Call for action}{31}{section.5.7}%
|
||||
\contentsline {chapter}{Bibliography}{32}{section.5.7}%
|
||||
\contentsline {chapter}{List of Figures}{38}{chapter*.3}%
|
||||
\contentsline {chapter}{List of Listings}{39}{chapter*.3}%
|
||||
\contentsline {chapter}{GNU Free Documentation License}{40}{chapter*.5}%
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue