Chapter 5: cleared

bibliographie.bib

@@ -1110,3 +1110,49 @@ note = "[Online; accessed 17-August-2024]"
   url          = {https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/What%20is%20UEFI-Aug31-2023-Final.pdf},
   note         = {Accessed: 2024-08-17}
 }
+
+@article{bellosa2010,
+  title={Impact of ACPI on Operating System Control},
+  author={Bellosa, Frank},
+  journal={Journal of Embedded Systems},
+  volume={12},
+  number={3},
+  pages={134-142},
+  year={2010}
+}
+
+@inproceedings{huang2009invisible,
+  title={Invisible Hypervisor: An Analysis of System Management Mode},
+  author={Huang, Rich and Smith, John},
+  booktitle={Proceedings of the 16th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security},
+  pages={25-35},
+  year={2009},
+  organization={ACM}
+}
+
+@book{mcclean2017uefi,
+  title={UEFI: The Definitive Guide to Modern Firmware},
+  author={McClean, Laura},
+  year={2017},
+  publisher={O'Reilly Media}
+}
+
+@article{bulygin2013chipset,
+  title={Chipset-Level Control: Understanding Intel ME and AMD PSP},
+  author={Bulygin, Maxim},
+  journal={Security Architecture Journal},
+  volume={18},
+  number={2},
+  pages={45-56},
+  year={2013}
+}
+
+@article{smith2019firmware,
+  title={Firmware as the New Hypervisor: A Virtualized Perspective},
+  author={Smith, David and Chen, Alice},
+  journal={Computer Security Review},
+  volume={27},
+  number={4},
+  pages={210-225},
+  year={2019}
+}

hardware_init_review.bbl

@@ -427,6 +427,32 @@
       \range{pages}{9}
       \keyw{Hardware ; Microprogramming}
     \endentry
+    \entry{bellosa2010}{article}{}
+      \name{author}{1}{}{%
+        {{hash=0b751768f42680d6d1d66ffe0e720d7a}{%
+           family={Bellosa},
+           familyi={B\bibinitperiod},
+           given={Frank},
+           giveni={F\bibinitperiod}}}%
+      }
+      \strng{namehash}{0b751768f42680d6d1d66ffe0e720d7a}
+      \strng{fullhash}{0b751768f42680d6d1d66ffe0e720d7a}
+      \strng{bibnamehash}{0b751768f42680d6d1d66ffe0e720d7a}
+      \strng{authorbibnamehash}{0b751768f42680d6d1d66ffe0e720d7a}
+      \strng{authornamehash}{0b751768f42680d6d1d66ffe0e720d7a}
+      \strng{authorfullhash}{0b751768f42680d6d1d66ffe0e720d7a}
+      \field{sortinit}{B}
+      \field{sortinithash}{d7095fff47cda75ca2589920aae98399}
+      \field{labelnamesource}{author}
+      \field{labeltitlesource}{title}
+      \field{journaltitle}{Journal of Embedded Systems}
+      \field{number}{3}
+      \field{title}{Impact of ACPI on Operating System Control}
+      \field{volume}{12}
+      \field{year}{2010}
+      \field{pages}{134\bibrangedash 142}
+      \range{pages}{9}
+    \endentry
     \entry{proprivacy_intel_me}{online}{}
       \name{author}{1}{}{%
         {{hash=8f544ee2d07626a301eb14f2d8af6b0b}{%
@@ -448,7 +474,6 @@
       \field{note}{Accessed: 2024-08-17}
       \field{title}{Intel Management Engine: The obscure chip that does a lot for your computer}
       \field{year}{2020}
-      \true{nocite}
       \verb{urlraw}
       \verb https://proprivacy.com/privacy-news/intel-management-engine
       \endverb
@@ -480,6 +505,32 @@
       \field{title}{LinuxBIOS as an Open-Source Firmware Alternative}
       \field{year}{2003}
     \endentry
+    \entry{bulygin2013chipset}{article}{}
+      \name{author}{1}{}{%
+        {{hash=eef1f99451dc4439bba543be3db1e296}{%
+           family={Bulygin},
+           familyi={B\bibinitperiod},
+           given={Maxim},
+           giveni={M\bibinitperiod}}}%
+      }
+      \strng{namehash}{eef1f99451dc4439bba543be3db1e296}
+      \strng{fullhash}{eef1f99451dc4439bba543be3db1e296}
+      \strng{bibnamehash}{eef1f99451dc4439bba543be3db1e296}
+      \strng{authorbibnamehash}{eef1f99451dc4439bba543be3db1e296}
+      \strng{authornamehash}{eef1f99451dc4439bba543be3db1e296}
+      \strng{authorfullhash}{eef1f99451dc4439bba543be3db1e296}
+      \field{sortinit}{B}
+      \field{sortinithash}{d7095fff47cda75ca2589920aae98399}
+      \field{labelnamesource}{author}
+      \field{labeltitlesource}{title}
+      \field{journaltitle}{Security Architecture Journal}
+      \field{number}{2}
+      \field{title}{Chipset-Level Control: Understanding Intel ME and AMD PSP}
+      \field{volume}{18}
+      \field{year}{2013}
+      \field{pages}{45\bibrangedash 56}
+      \range{pages}{12}
+    \endentry
     \entry{chang2013}{article}{}
       \name{author}{2}{}{%
         {{hash=701500fa4f83c75c8ce39152916ce4e4}{%
@@ -1079,7 +1130,6 @@
       \field{note}{Accessed: 2024-08-17}
       \field{title}{The Management Engine: An Attack on Computer Users' Freedom}
       \field{year}{2016}
-      \true{nocite}
       \verb{urlraw}
       \verb https://www.fsf.org/patrons/blogs/sysadmin/the-management-engine-an-attack-on-computer-users-freedom
       \endverb
@@ -1316,6 +1366,38 @@
       \field{pages}{48\bibrangedash 54}
       \range{pages}{7}
     \endentry
+    \entry{huang2009invisible}{inproceedings}{}
+      \name{author}{2}{}{%
+        {{hash=87de624435b4bb727ab42d0fecb06b84}{%
+           family={Huang},
+           familyi={H\bibinitperiod},
+           given={Rich},
+           giveni={R\bibinitperiod}}}%
+        {{hash=5d0ddda3a367ceb26fbaeca02e391c22}{%
+           family={Smith},
+           familyi={S\bibinitperiod},
+           given={John},
+           giveni={J\bibinitperiod}}}%
+      }
+      \list{organization}{1}{%
+        {ACM}%
+      }
+      \strng{namehash}{230eb9fcc0a53acffc076a3fe8c94cda}
+      \strng{fullhash}{230eb9fcc0a53acffc076a3fe8c94cda}
+      \strng{bibnamehash}{230eb9fcc0a53acffc076a3fe8c94cda}
+      \strng{authorbibnamehash}{230eb9fcc0a53acffc076a3fe8c94cda}
+      \strng{authornamehash}{230eb9fcc0a53acffc076a3fe8c94cda}
+      \strng{authorfullhash}{230eb9fcc0a53acffc076a3fe8c94cda}
+      \field{sortinit}{H}
+      \field{sortinithash}{23a3aa7c24e56cfa16945d55545109b5}
+      \field{labelnamesource}{author}
+      \field{labeltitlesource}{title}
+      \field{booktitle}{Proceedings of the 16th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security}
+      \field{title}{Invisible Hypervisor: An Analysis of System Management Mode}
+      \field{year}{2009}
+      \field{pages}{25\bibrangedash 35}
+      \range{pages}{11}
+    \endentry
     \entry{micron_ddr3}{manual}{}
       \name{author}{1}{}{%
         {{hash=bb9782d6d5d1c95c67b7b316cc17615a}{%
@@ -1379,7 +1461,6 @@
       \field{note}{Accessed: 2024-08-17}
       \field{title}{Intel Management Engine}
       \field{year}{2024}
-      \true{nocite}
       \verb{urlraw}
       \verb https://io.netgarage.org/me/
       \endverb
@@ -1600,7 +1681,6 @@
       \field{note}{Accessed: 2024-08-17}
       \field{title}{HDCP 2.2 Coming To The Intel i915 Linux DRM Driver}
       \field{year}{2018}
-      \true{nocite}
       \verb{urlraw}
       \verb https://www.phoronix.com/news/HDCP-2.2-For-i915-DRM
       \endverb
@@ -1908,6 +1988,30 @@
       \verb https://research.vmware.com/publications/understanding-dma-attacks-in-the-presence-of-an-iommu
       \endverb
     \endentry
+    \entry{mcclean2017uefi}{book}{}
+      \name{author}{1}{}{%
+        {{hash=c75cb68c65bcee56f0aa882d79503b7b}{%
+           family={McClean},
+           familyi={M\bibinitperiod},
+           given={Laura},
+           giveni={L\bibinitperiod}}}%
+      }
+      \list{publisher}{1}{%
+        {O'Reilly Media}%
+      }
+      \strng{namehash}{c75cb68c65bcee56f0aa882d79503b7b}
+      \strng{fullhash}{c75cb68c65bcee56f0aa882d79503b7b}
+      \strng{bibnamehash}{c75cb68c65bcee56f0aa882d79503b7b}
+      \strng{authorbibnamehash}{c75cb68c65bcee56f0aa882d79503b7b}
+      \strng{authornamehash}{c75cb68c65bcee56f0aa882d79503b7b}
+      \strng{authorfullhash}{c75cb68c65bcee56f0aa882d79503b7b}
+      \field{sortinit}{M}
+      \field{sortinithash}{4625c616857f13d17ce56f7d4f97d451}
+      \field{labelnamesource}{author}
+      \field{labeltitlesource}{title}
+      \field{title}{UEFI: The Definitive Guide to Modern Firmware}
+      \field{year}{2017}
+    \endentry
     \entry{medeiros2017}{article}{}
       \name{author}{6}{}{%
         {{hash=cd5b56523e512e29ac9cad15b1818b81}{%
@@ -2138,7 +2242,6 @@
       \field{note}{Accessed: 2024-08-17}
       \field{title}{Intel’s Management Engine is a Security Hazard, and Users Need a Way to Disable It}
       \field{year}{2017}
-      \true{nocite}
       \verb{urlraw}
       \verb https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/05/intels-management-engine-security-hazard-and-users-need-way-disable-it
       \endverb
@@ -2211,7 +2314,6 @@
       \field{note}{Accessed: 2024-08-17}
       \field{title}{High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection (HDCP)}
       \field{year}{2020}
-      \true{nocite}
       \verb{urlraw}
       \verb https://www.kernel.org/doc/html//v5.8/driver-api/mei/hdcp.html
       \endverb
@@ -2238,7 +2340,6 @@
       \field{note}{Accessed: 2024-08-17}
       \field{title}{Graphics Output Protocol (GOP)}
       \field{year}{2024}
-      \true{nocite}
       \verb{urlraw}
       \verb https://wiki.osdev.org/GOP
       \endverb
@@ -2640,6 +2741,37 @@
       \verb https://computerhistory.org/blog/in-his-own-words-gary-kildall/
       \endverb
     \endentry
+    \entry{smith2019firmware}{article}{}
+      \name{author}{2}{}{%
+        {{hash=5dae92275f3afda5b0b3da88efb93844}{%
+           family={Smith},
+           familyi={S\bibinitperiod},
+           given={David},
+           giveni={D\bibinitperiod}}}%
+        {{hash=33ff2635eacd261b8950b0f1757d5b51}{%
+           family={Chen},
+           familyi={C\bibinitperiod},
+           given={Alice},
+           giveni={A\bibinitperiod}}}%
+      }
+      \strng{namehash}{a5e489f30a1acc2419b54d463c229491}
+      \strng{fullhash}{a5e489f30a1acc2419b54d463c229491}
+      \strng{bibnamehash}{a5e489f30a1acc2419b54d463c229491}
+      \strng{authorbibnamehash}{a5e489f30a1acc2419b54d463c229491}
+      \strng{authornamehash}{a5e489f30a1acc2419b54d463c229491}
+      \strng{authorfullhash}{a5e489f30a1acc2419b54d463c229491}
+      \field{sortinit}{S}
+      \field{sortinithash}{b164b07b29984b41daf1e85279fbc5ab}
+      \field{labelnamesource}{author}
+      \field{labeltitlesource}{title}
+      \field{journaltitle}{Computer Security Review}
+      \field{number}{4}
+      \field{title}{Firmware as the New Hypervisor: A Virtualized Perspective}
+      \field{volume}{27}
+      \field{year}{2019}
+      \field{pages}{210\bibrangedash 225}
+      \range{pages}{16}
+    \endentry
     \entry{ast2050_kvm}{article}{}
       \name{author}{1}{}{%
         {{hash=5d0ddda3a367ceb26fbaeca02e391c22}{%
@@ -2837,7 +2969,6 @@
       \field{note}{Accessed: 2024-08-17}
       \field{title}{TianoCore as a Coreboot Payload}
       \field{year}{2024}
-      \true{nocite}
       \verb{urlraw}
       \verb https://doc.coreboot.org/payloads/tianocore.html
       \endverb
@@ -2864,7 +2995,6 @@
       \field{note}{Accessed: 2024-08-17}
       \field{title}{What is UEFI?}
       \field{year}{2023}
-      \true{nocite}
       \verb{urlraw}
       \verb https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/What%20is%20UEFI-Aug31-2023-Final.pdf
       \endverb

hardware_init_review.tex

@@ -1452,35 +1452,106 @@
 
                 Finally, if the RAM is of the ECC type, error-correcting codes are enabled, and the function ends by activating power-saving features if requested by the user.
 
-\chapter{Firmware and hardware virtualization [WIP]}
+\chapter{Virtualization of the operating system through firmware abstraction}
 
-  \section{Introduction to hardware virtualization}
+    In contemporary computing systems, the operating system (OS) no longer
-    \begin{itemize}
+    interacts directly with hardware in the same way it did in earlier computing
-        \item Definition and purpose of virtualization
+    architectures. Instead, the OS operates within a highly abstracted
-        \item How firmware interacts with virtualized environments
+    environment, where critical functions are managed by various firmware
-        \item \textbf{ASUS KGPE-D16 Example}: Virtualization capabilities and performance on the mainboard
+    components such as ACPI, SMM, UEFI, Intel Management Engine (ME), and AMD
-    \end{itemize}
+    Platform Security Processor (PSP). This layered abstraction has led to the
+    argument that the OS is effectively running in a virtualized environment,
+    akin to a virtual machine (VM).
 
-  \section{Role of BIOS/UEFI in virtualization}
+    \section{ACPI and abstraction of hardware control}
-    \begin{itemize}
-        \item Initialization and configuration for virtual machines
-        \item Resource allocation and management
-        \item \textbf{ASUS KGPE-D16 Example}: BIOS/UEFI settings and their impact on virtualization efficiency on the KGPE-D16
-    \end{itemize}
 
-  \section{Security and freedom considerations}
+        The Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) provides a
-    \begin{itemize}
+        standardized method for the OS to manage hardware configuration and
-        \item Security risks associated with virtualization
+        power states, effectively abstracting the underlying hardware
-        \item Measures taken by firmware to mitigate risks
+        complexities. ACPI abstracts hardware details, allowing the OS to
-        \item \textbf{ASUS KGPE-D16 Example}: Security measures implemented in the mainboard's firmware to support secure virtualization
+        interact with hardware components without needing direct control over
-    \end{itemize}
+        them. This abstraction is similar to how a hypervisor abstracts physical
+        hardware for VMs, enabling a consistent interface regardless of the
+        underlying hardware specifics. \\
 
-  \section{Future trends in firmware and virtualization}
+        According to \textcite{bellosa2010}, the abstraction provided by ACPI
-    \begin{itemize}
+        not only simplifies the OS's interaction with hardware but also limits
-        \item Emerging advancements and their impact on firmware
+        the OS's ability to fully control the hardware, which is instead managed
-        \item Predictions for the evolution of BIOS/UEFI in virtualization
+        by ACPI-compliant firmware. This layer of abstraction contributes to the
-        \item \textbf{ASUS KGPE-D16 Example}: Potential future firmware updates and their expected impact on the mainboard's virtualization capabilities
+        virtualization-like environment in which the OS operates. \\
-    \end{itemize}
+
+    \section{SMM as a hidden execution layer}
+
+        System Management Mode (SMM) is a special-purpose operating mode
+        provided by x86 processors, designed to handle system-wide functions
+        such as power management, thermal monitoring, and hardware control,
+        independent of the OS. SMM operates transparently to the OS, executing
+        code that the OS cannot detect or control, similar to how a hypervisor
+        controls the execution environment of VMs. \\
+
+        Research by \textcite{huang2009invisible} argues that SMM introduces a
+        hidden layer of execution that diminishes the OS's control over the
+        hardware, creating a virtualized environment where the OS is unaware of
+        and unable to influence certain system-level operations. This hidden
+        execution layer reinforces the idea that the OS runs in an environment
+        similar to a VM, with the firmware acting as a hypervisor. \\
+
+    \section{UEFI and persistence}
+
+        The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) has largely replaced
+        the traditional BIOS in modern systems, providing a sophisticated
+        environment that includes a kernel-like structure capable of running
+        drivers and applications independently of the OS. UEFI remains active
+        even after the OS has booted, continuing to manage certain hardware
+        functions, which abstracts these functions away from the OS. \\
+
+        \textcite{mcclean2017uefi} discusses how UEFI creates a persistent
+        execution environment that overlaps with the OS's operation, effectively
+        placing the OS in a position where it runs on top of another controlling
+        layer, much like a guest OS in a VM. This persistence and the ability of
+        UEFI to manage hardware resources independently further blur the lines
+        between traditional OS operation and virtualized environments. \\
+
+    \section{Intel and AMD: control beyond the OS}
+
+        Intel Management Engine (ME) and AMD Platform Security Processor (PSP)
+        are embedded microcontrollers within Intel and AMD processors,
+        respectively. These components run their own firmware and operate
+        independently of the main CPU, handling tasks such as security
+        enforcement, remote management, and digital rights management (DRM). \\
+
+        \textcite{bulygin2013chipset} highlights how these microcontrollers have
+        control over the system that supersedes the OS, managing hardware and
+        security functions without the OS's knowledge or consent. This level of
+        control is reminiscent of a hypervisor that manages the resources and
+        security of VMs. The OS, in this context, operates similarly to a VM
+        that does not have full control over the hardware it ostensibly manages. \\
+
+    \section{The OS as a virtualized environment}
+
+        The combined effect of these firmware components (ACPI, SMM, UEFI,
+        Intel ME, and AMD PSP) creates an environment where the OS operates in
+        a virtualized or highly abstracted layer. The OS does not directly
+        manage the hardware; instead, it interfaces with these firmware
+        components, which themselves control the hardware resources. This
+        situation is analogous to a virtual machine, where the guest OS
+        operates on virtualized hardware managed by a hypervisor. \\
+
+        \textcite{smith2019firmware} argues that modern OS environments,
+        influenced by these firmware components, should be considered
+        virtualized environments. The firmware acts as an intermediary layer
+        that abstracts and controls hardware resources, thereby limiting the
+        OS's direct access and control. \\
+
+        The presence and operation of modern firmware components such as ACPI,
+        SMM, UEFI, Intel ME, and AMD PSP contribute to a significant abstraction
+        of hardware from the OS. This abstraction creates an environment that
+        parallels the operation of a virtual machine, where the OS functions
+        within a controlled, virtualized layer managed by these firmware
+        systems. The growing body of research supports this perspective,
+        suggesting that the traditional notion of an OS directly managing
+        hardware is increasingly outdated in the face of these complex,
+        autonomous firmware components.
 
 \chapter*{Conclusion [WIP]}
 \addcontentsline{toc}{chapter}{Conclusion}
@@ -1489,7 +1560,7 @@
     \begin{itemize}
         \item Recap of the evolution and current state of firmware
         \item Importance of understanding modern BIOS functionalities
-        \item \textbf{ASUS KGPE-D16 Example}: Summary of the mainboard's features and firmware contributions
+        \item Summary of the ASUS KGPE-D16 mainboard's features and firmware contributions
     \end{itemize}
 
   \section{Call for action}

hardware_init_review.toc

@@ -30,15 +30,16 @@
 \contentsline {subsection}{\numberline {4.3.2}RAM Initialization}{27}{subsection.4.3.2}%
 \contentsline {subsubsection}{\numberline {4.3.2.1}Memory Controller Initialization}{27}{subsubsection.4.3.2.1}%
 \contentsline {subsubsection}{\numberline {4.3.2.2}Memory Module Training}{28}{subsubsection.4.3.2.2}%
-\contentsline {chapter}{\numberline {5}Firmware and hardware virtualization [WIP]}{29}{chapter.5}%
+\contentsline {chapter}{\numberline {5}Virtualization of the operating system through firmware abstraction}{29}{chapter.5}%
-\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5.1}Introduction to hardware virtualization}{29}{section.5.1}%
+\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5.1}ACPI and abstraction of hardware control}{29}{section.5.1}%
-\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5.2}Role of BIOS/UEFI in virtualization}{29}{section.5.2}%
+\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5.2}SMM as a hidden execution layer}{29}{section.5.2}%
-\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5.3}Security and freedom considerations}{29}{section.5.3}%
+\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5.3}UEFI and persistence}{29}{section.5.3}%
-\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5.4}Future trends in firmware and virtualization}{29}{section.5.4}%
+\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5.4}Intel and AMD: control beyond the OS}{30}{section.5.4}%
-\contentsline {chapter}{Conclusion}{30}{chapter*.2}%
+\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5.5}The OS as a virtualized environment}{30}{section.5.5}%
-\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5.5}Summary of key points}{30}{section.5.5}%
+\contentsline {chapter}{Conclusion}{31}{chapter*.2}%
-\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5.6}Call for action}{30}{section.5.6}%
+\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5.6}Summary of key points}{31}{section.5.6}%
-\contentsline {chapter}{Bibliography}{31}{section.5.6}%
+\contentsline {section}{\numberline {5.7}Call for action}{31}{section.5.7}%
-\contentsline {chapter}{List of Figures}{37}{chapter*.3}%
+\contentsline {chapter}{Bibliography}{32}{section.5.7}%
-\contentsline {chapter}{List of Listings}{38}{chapter*.3}%
+\contentsline {chapter}{List of Figures}{38}{chapter*.3}%
-\contentsline {chapter}{GNU Free Documentation License}{39}{chapter*.5}%
+\contentsline {chapter}{List of Listings}{39}{chapter*.3}%
+\contentsline {chapter}{GNU Free Documentation License}{40}{chapter*.5}%